




# BOKO HARAM TACTICAL & STRATEGIC SYSTEMS

...Analyzing the Boko Haram conflict system's grand plot...

## Boko Haram Systems Intervention Points



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*...Analyzing the Boko Haram conflict system's grand plot...*

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## ABSTRACT

Behind the Boko Haram open systems of conflict is a two pronged objective, firstly, political violence that is designed to make the nation ungovernable and discredit President Goodluck Jonathan under the guise of the inability to secure the nation. Secondly, religious genocidal violence, aimed at drastically reducing the Christian population in the North, so as to diminish on the presence and power of the church, and its population, which has shown strong support for candidates from the common people, like Goodluck Jonathan. Political elites who strongly desire to rule, or had contested elections against him in the past, promised, and threatened to make the nation ungovernable if he won the 2011 elections. The threats were followed up later with varied violence across the North. Such threats are already being repeatedly voiced concerning 2015 elections – both for the PDP primaries and the general elections. With Goodluck Jonathan's winning of the 2011 elections, the political elites took advantage of the existing Boko Haram (BH) sect, radicalizing, ideologicalizing, and financing it, turning it into a killer machine, to inflict injury on the government and people of Nigeria. The elites designed a progressive systems terrorist grand plan, to terrorize government and Nigerians aimed at culminating in a coordinated violence, spread across the nation, thereby hoping to make the government weak or ineffective, so it will have little practical control over much of the regions. This will result in massive inability and failure of public services, widespread corruption, and criminality; which in turn will create refugees and involuntary movement of populations nationwide, leading to sharp decline of economic activities, and inability to provide any sort of security. Of course, when the State fails, it is unable to neither interact with other states as a full member of the international community, nor have the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in its boundaries, due to the erosion of the power of the legitimate authority to make collective decisions. This article analyzes the BH systems, documents political elite's threats, and demands that government do what will work for the survival of the nation by arresting and prosecuting all threat-bullies to cut off the blood flow of the BH system.

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## SEEING SYSTEMS NOT ATOMISM OR EMERISM

In global affairs, the former atomistic and holistic ways of thinking have shifted. Earlier, trends of thinking moved to both emergeristic and atomistic dimensions. However, another shift is gradually occurring in ways of thinking towards a more rigorous but holistic worldview. This requires thinking of issues or facts, and events in terms of the forest, not just the trees, but wholes forming interrelated arrangements with their own elemental attributes and interactions. Boko Haram (BH) conflict requires thinking of each individual conflict event or local attack and how they all converge toward a single coherent goal or outcome. The attacks are no more random, as was suspected; the people covertly maneuvering the events seem to be strategizing the different attacks, intentionally targeted at arriving or culminating to a grand goal. The individual events are only used to make statements that should point any systems thinker to their ultimate culminating outcome or intention. This ultimate intention is the forest that should be looked at, and not just trying to study Abubakar Shekau and the kidnapped girl's situation, or the sporadic attacks happening in different towns and villages. The grand plan will tell what the subparts are trying to say. The grand plan is the forest of the conflict. Seeing the forest, will therefore tell the interconnection, inter-relations or interlays of the individual attack events, and predict what their next move may be. This then will reveal the other suspects engaged in the conflict apart from Shekau, the fighters in the field, and the casualties they inflict on the society. According to Laszlo (2002), "looking at the world in terms of such sets of integrated relations is the current and next choice over atomism, mechanism, and uncoordinated specialization." When we think in systems, we are able to see the whole forest in our world and us in that sphere. We are able to fully appreciate what we are up against or engaged with. Contextualizing this in relation to the BH conflict, Nigerians must not just see Abubakar Shekau as the problem, there is a forest that includes trees of other interests, personalities and interrelated reasoning, activities and events behind the whole strategy of the Boko Haram terrorism. These complex interactions exist in reality, and not just in people's thinking. Instead of reducing things to the miniscule atom, we complexify them to their multi-level of systems so as to truly see and understand the atoms involved in the situation. We must complexify the situation by expanding our minds to create scenarios of possible multi-levels of interests, individuals, and activities that may be at play. The situation is no more what government said it was, which is, Islamic militants who have grievances to settle, who are using violence to achieve the goal of setting up an Islamic empire. There is a grand plot that the militants are playing up to or for. The nation needs to step back so as to be able to think out, and understand how the full situation is strategized to play out, it will then be understood why the atoms, or personalities, or individuals involved in the situation are dancing the way they are dancing, or behaving the way they are behaving. The idea of the grand plot is detailed elsewhere in the body of this paper. To understand why the atomized character in the conflict like, Abubakar Shekau is behaving the way he is, one must be able to discover the forest he is a tree in, then one may understand why he talks, does and projects himself the way he does. When the Bus station was bombed in Nyanya, Abuja, Shekau said in a video that they were in Abuja and there was nothing the government or president can do to find them, why was he making this boast? Seeing in systems will simply analyze this to mean, he has powerful people hiding his men in Abuja, so no one can get them. These powerful men live in government protected houses, drive cars with government numbers, or are too important that no one dares to search, and have names thicker than any bullet can riddle. They are well positioned in the government or society that they are trusted without a second thought of them stooping low to collaborate with BH. They are able to use government systems to carry out duties in the aid of Boko Haram. So, one must step back and see the full forest to understand the interplay of things. See the full house, not the individual bolts, and nuts or nails in the roof or wall, but how the materials used in building the house are fitly organized to arrive at the complete or various functional whole. In this way, we can arrive at a credible and plausible generalization of predictable qualities or variables that will allow for individual distinctions. This will help with the understand of how the sets of events, for instance, in Boko Haram are organized or structured to function in relation to their environment, space and time. Atomizing a conflict situation, and killing the individual atoms one by one, is like tearing down a building but leaving the architect who has the concept of the building untouched. He will just rebuild the concept again using other atoms. Robert Pirsig (*Zen and the Art of motorcycle maintenance*) said:

"If a factory is torn down, but the rationality which produced it is left standing, then that rationality will simply produce another factory. If a revolution destroys a government, but the systematic patterns of thought that produced that government, are intact, then those patterns will repeat themselves..." (Meadows, 2008, p. xiv).

Understanding Abubakar Shekau, the fighters, and the footmen, will do nothing in helping government solve the conflict. A Sufi Islam teaching says:

"You think that because you understand "one" that you must therefore understand "two" because one plus one make two. But you forget that you must also understand the "and" (Meadows, 2008, p. 12). The 'and' is the system's interconnected aspect that, *one plus one*, does not out rightly tell the whole story by the outcome of 'two.' In a system, a tiny speck can have such a strong voice, stand so tall, and look so intimidating; but isolate it, it becomes weak, and nonsensical as it really is. The systems interplay empower and makes it really great, without affecting the system, its boast will remain intact, but, impact the system, the whole house will come down with its architects.

## SEEING THE FOREST

Seeing the forest allows us to find the architect of the forest, or the thought that formed it. To understand whether one is looking at the elemental parts and not the system, one will need to identify to himself whether one is always noticing just the individuals in the conflict or the whole, if one fails to see how the parts interact to produce results, one will be unable to judge that the outcome of the system's activities are greater than each part's individual effect. Does the sum total effect and behavior of the system over time persist in a variety of circumstances? If this is so, then one is dealing with a multi-level system that must be addressed accordingly. In that case, one will notice that the outcomes of the system's activities are always greater than each part's individual effect, but one will see how the elemental events are building up to a coherent goal. When one looks at the Boko Haram capacity in attacks and bank robberies, one knows that it is not the rag tag militants that can think up, and structure that kind of well-rounded performance; they must be aided by something more complex working with higher intelligence. One can interpret thus that the attack events are not just random but intentional to achieve an objective. Consider all the burning and killings of whole villages and towns in Taraba, Benue, and Nasarawa states; and the killings in Plateau state, the bombings in Abuja, the bomb scares in Eastern and Western Nigeria, are they all random activities by incoherent, unlearned militants? Or are they strategic systemized and intentional actions leading to a greater peak, to satisfy the interests, and intentions of some coherent, interconnected political actor or actors. When major gains are made by security forces against Boko Haram, one will think they're gone, but suddenly, another ring of attacks begin in a coordinated fashion, seemingly building on from the past attacks, and leading to a pre-planned goal. It's all about the political life of the nation. As general Buhari said, "a hound and a monkey engaged in a battle for survival" (Binniyat, 2012). He and probably his political elite alliance are in a struggle to take over government, a major political strategy to effect this, is to make sure "the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood," according to general Buhari (Binniyat, 2012). Politics and politicians never operate alone, it works as a system. These systems must be understood to adequately address them effectively.

A Canadian prime politician, in pondering about how systems impact the political structure said: "An interrelationship exists between all elements and constituents of society. The essential factors in public problems, issues, policies, and programs must always be considered and evaluated as interdependent components of a total system," (Manning, 1967)

For life to occur, small units must be seen as things that work together functionally in bigger systems to produce products. Small things can work up miracles in cooperation with other subparts in a system formation. A system must have interconnected parts that work together to produce products. If a system doesn't work interconnectedly to produce products, it is not a system. It has failed, and needs to be transformed completely, or out rightly replaced. When the whole system is observed and appreciated, it is easier to appreciate the capacity of the subparts than when viewed as individual agents.

## CRIMINAL INTENT OR TREASONABLE THREATS

The court martial of the army officers, and the kidnap of the almost 300 Chibok school girls confirms the idea that Boko Haram is not just a sect, but a religious-faced system used to perpetrate political violence. They are working towards the end where their owners will either rule the nation or "the dog and the baboon would *all* be soaked in blood" (Binniyat, 2012). So, the Boko Haram strings of coordinated attacks are meant to contain the dog, and keep it from misbehaving by rigging the elections. If the dog fails to heed, and misbehaves, then the dog and baboon will be covered in blood, meaning, Boko haram the instrument being used, or some other instrument will so let blood in the nation, that both, the dog and baboon will not be recognized, because of the volume of blood that will be flowing all around them or in the nation. The word '*all*' in the fateful general Buhari's statement ("the dog and the baboon would *all* be soaked in blood") means the whole nation. The '*all*' was used in a very subtle, concealed, or masked way. One has to read in-between the lines. Isn't there a grand plan?

Fox news reports that about 15 generals and senior officers were found guilty by a court martial of aiding Boko Haram militants (Faul, 2014). They aided the militants with a goal in mind. The goal may not have been of direct benefit to such generals, but the underwriters of the BH systems, who have used the generals in an individually convoluted but interconnected, and interactive system. These are powerful political elites and presidential aspirants and their like, who themselves were former military generals or business moguls of questionable wealth. The grand plan or the Boko Haram systems, say the arrested generals were acting under the inspiration of the retired generals, or other interest-loaded underwriters who are interested in the office of the president or some other political motivation, who had promised the president that if he won the 2011 election, they would make the nation ungovernable. "When President Goodluck Jonathan confirmed that he would contest the 2011 presidential election, great opposition rose against him in the North. The first bombshell came from Shehu Sani, a Kaduna based civil rights activist who said, "President Goodluck Jonathan should not contemplate contesting the 2011 presidential election. Any attempt by him to contest, amounts to incitement, and a recipe for *political instability*. Even though rotational presidency is unconstitutional, it has been able to address problems of regional, ethnic, sectional domination and marginalization" (Anyia, 2012). The warning precluding President Jonathan from contesting the 2011 presidential election did not stop with Shehu Sani, as Alhaji Lawal Kaita, a close associate of former Vice President Atiku Abubakar added his voice to the agitation when he said, "The North is determined, if it happens, to make the country ungovernable for President Jonathan or any other Southerner who finds his way to the seat of power on the platform of the PDP against the principle of the party's zoning policy. Anything short of a Northerner president is tantamount to stealing our

presidency. Jonathan has to go and he will go. Even if he uses incumbency power to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, he would be frustrated out,” with these words, the battle line between President Jonathan and his opponents was drawn,” (Anyia, 2012).

Binniyat (2012) reveals that General Buhari in a recent June, 2014 interview, said, “2015’ll be bloody if the elections were not transparent, just as he dismissed reports that he would not contest the 2015 presidency.” General Buhari was said to have painted a gory picture of Nigeria as that of “a hound and a monkey engaged in a battle for survival said, “God willing, by 2015, something will happen. They either conduct a free and fair election or they go a very disgraceful way. If what happened in 2011 (alleged rigging, no legally determined proof) should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood.” Who determines what a free and fair election will be when courts are discredited by the opposition after losing elections. General Buhari has lost in elections three times in the past in his bid to become president. Nigerians have rejected him this three times. How long does a man take to understand No? Is an election automatically to be regarded as rigged because Buhari lost? Will elections be free and fair only when he wins? Could it be, that general Buhari means, ‘if he loses the election’ that the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood? He should tell us how he intends to achieve “the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood.” This agrees with the awareness that there is a grand plan on ground to intentionally and strategically destabilize Nigeria, in the event that the opposition loses. To corroborate that this grand plan is a system of political elites working up by interrelated events to acquire their desires, or destroy Nigeria, other Northern political elites have similarly echoed, or confirmed General Buhari’s ideologies and sentiments. Like the utterances of Alhaji Lawal Kaita, a prominent member of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) who made the following statement in October of 2010, “anything short of a Northern President is tantamount to stealing our presidency. Jonathan has to go, and he will go. Even if he uses incumbency powers to get his nomination on the platform of the PDP, *he will be frustrated out*,” (Pundit, 2011). How else do you frustrate a man out of office besides the wanton bloodletting, and insecurity being witnessed today? What is next to come based on the grand plan of seeing the forest? General Buhari said “...by 2015, something will happen” (Binniyat, 2012). What does the Boko Haram system have up its sleeves next, as they wait for 2015? What can Nigeria do to undermine the ‘something’ general Buhari is promising Nigeria in 2015? Nigeria must do something to prevent this ultimate grand plan, since every threat they made so far has been followed through. They said Nigeria will be ungovernable if Goodluck Jonathan won the 2011 elections, well he did, and has the nation not been ungovernable since? The warning about blood will flow in 2015 must be taken seriously, planned and worked against strategically. A massive recruitment into the Army, police and all other security branches has become necessary to deal with the 2015 threats, so that the ratio of army and police to the number of population can be brought to UN standards. Nigeria must be well policed from this time onwards, sustainably. The situation where government is not felt in many parts of the country, which has allowed BH to breed undiscovered, and unleash its wickedness on the population unchecked, must end. Security agents need to be seen on every square meter of any land called Nigeria. They should be fully equipped with gears that will power them to exert control. The multiple mechanisms and gearwheels of security, the relations of authority and force, will create, modify, apply, and impose respect for the legal approach to doing things right by all without taking away the individual’s and community’s rights and identity. Impunity must also be expunged; law and order must be upheld. Everyone must be made to respect the law, and those who don’t, must be called to take responsibility, because the whole purpose of the law is to right wrongs. Many may call that a policed state, but the insecurity of today calls for it; besides, it allows Nigerians to find legitimate employment that will be positively advantageous to the nation. The tight security experimented in Ekiti state during its June 2014 gubernatorial elections are a good example of what is required. Many may not have liked it, but it worked, it prevented escalations of violence. However that will not result in a policed state. A police state is a nation where the government exercises rigid and repressive controls over the social, economic, and political life of the populace. It characteristically exhibits elements of totalitarianism and social control, widespread state surveillance and suppression of free speech, and there is usually little or no distinction between the law and the exercise of political power by the executive. But, placing and increasing police presence in every square mile of the nation, should simply mean government wants you safe. No one who keeps the law has any reason to fear the police, since they are there to address the lawless. When you have police all around you, just live right, and no one will distress you.

### **BOKO HARAM PATRONAGE?**

In ‘The Street Journal’ of February 2012, in an article titled “Revealed: How IBB, Buhari, Atiku, Others Sponsor Boko Haram!” Sheikh Sani Haliru a former Boko Haram jihadist, and a lieutenant of Mohammed Yusuf, founder of Boko Haram, confessed that, “March 5, 1987 to be very precise, the “Evil Genius” General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida secretly armed us through one of his close aides by the name of Captain Hassan Abubakar (now a Pastor with a fast growing church in Lagos). We went to go and kill some targeted Christians...” (SJ, 2012). The Boko haram structure, as I had earlier argued, has always been taken advantage of by political elites to do targeted killings, and wanton destructions of the opposition, or perceived enemies. “The former jihadist claimed to have been to eight different countries, namely, Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Libya, Somalia, Egypt, and Niger Republic.” He was trained as an attack Strategist in Libya and Pakistan alongside Nigerians and non-Nigerians alike. “One of the proofs of the training as he disclosed was a mark which he carries with him till date. The mark is in form of a sword held in a hand. That is regarded by those who went through the training as the “license to kill for Allah” (SJ, 2012).



He claimed that some Nigerians were his course mates in Libya, and Pakistan; right now, he said “they are scattered all over the country, and we were not too many then” (SJ, 2012). He gave a few names, which included Ali Baba Nur, Asari Dokubo, Jasper Akinbo, Mohammed Yusuf, Salisu Maigari, Danlami Abubakar, Cletus Okar, Ali Qaqa, Maigari Haliru and Asabe Dantala. He spoke further that, Asari Dokubo of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force was a year ahead of him in the Libyan training camp in Benghazi, (SJ, 2012).

As for those who financed their training, he said, “you will not believe me and only God will judge the Chief sponsor of terrorism in Nigeria whose name I will not mention because he is so powerful, and even the president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, is so much afraid of the man” (SJ, 2012).

He also claimed that “the man is no other person than the man they call IBB. As I am talking to you now, General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida (IBB) has more than 600 men and women Jihadists on his payroll. They are scattered all over the Country and he can use them to destroy Nigeria” (SJ, 2012). He further divulged that IBB still has his agents in the Nigeria Army, the Police, and the Air Force and in strategic economic positions. He purported that “Babangida’s loyalists can still be found in top political positions, in the National Assembly, in both the print and electronic arms of the media and even in Aso Rock, Nigeria’s seat of power” (SJ, 2012). To confirm this assertion, ‘Ixgmedia’ (2014) confirms that Arogbofa, Dasuki, Gusau, and Mark in the present government as Babangida ‘boys’ holding top offices. Naij (2013) says in an interview with journalists, Babangida said, the nation must trace the root of the BH problem. “The problem did not start in one day...it was gradual thing before it came to this level...owing to our negligence by the government, the elite and the people but I cannot blame anyone.. Some 20 years ago, we did not have this problem, what was the state of things then, what have we forgotten...that we have not done that led to the present challenges, this we have to look at.” Look critically at what he said, elites, government and the people must do something, not BH, they have nothing to do, to end the terrorism. He reminds government that it has forgotten to do something. What is this something? Could it be the political interests of the elites? Because they have been forgotten by the government and the people, they are now using BH to strike back to regain their space? Yes, 20 years ago, Babangida had control everywhere in the nation, but now, it seems he, and his allied elites have been forgotten, so government, or is it the people in PDP, that he wants to do something - to zone the 2015 presidency to the North so as to end the BH violence. What is the negligence by the people that has aggravated the BH terrorism – simply put; they did not allow him or his Northern allied elites into power in 2011, beginning with the PDP primaries. He said “the problem didn’t start one day...,” true, I had informed us earlier, that the preparation for the BH terrorism, began a long time ago, step by step, and bit by bit, when youths were recruited and trained as Nigerian army, they were posted to their primary places of assignment thereafter, but they did not show. The North was reading the handwriting on the wall, that power was shifting ground, so they began to prepare against the inevitable. They used the Nigerian army training facilities to train fighters, so they may have the power to strike back strategically using anything possible, including violence to wrest back power. In the words of Atiku, “Those who make peaceful change impossible, will make violent change inevitable” (thewillnigeria.com, 2014).

Sani Haliru further added that as a former Jihadist, “I have documented evidences to prove that General Mohammedu Buhari, Alhaji Abubaka Atiku, and some other top politicians and traditional rulers are some of the people behind Boko Haram” (SJ, 2012).

Sani Haliru said, “I have worked so closely with Mohammedu Buhari, for five years, and I can prove it that General Buhari is the most notable outspoken jihadist hardliner in Nigeria who is also strategically sponsoring Boko Haram” (SJ, 2012). I know situations in many cities including Jos, where, during general Buhari’s 2011 electioneering campaigns, his body guards would slaughter innocent bye-standers with machete. My wife’s co-worker in Jos, very innocent, and far removed from any election interests or politics, returning from treatment at Jankwano Hospital, was attacked by such vagrant fellows, who were body guarding Buhari at the Polo field Jos political campaign, and spilled his guts onto the road, they also killed some others. He and others died instantly. A riot began immediately that threatened to close down the campaign, Buhari must have been informed of the mean deeds by his guards, but the campaign continued as though nothing had occurred, nor was he heard to raise his voice publicly during the campaign to rebuke the killers, nor order for their arrest, or surrender them to law enforcement agents for processing.

Sani Haliru also accused the Bauchi State governor, Isa Yuguda as an ally of Boko Haram, confessing that when he was arrested and detained years ago, “soon after my immediate boss Mohammed Yusuf was killed in 2009, about 23 of us were arrested in one of our hideouts in Bauchi. But when Governor Isa Yaguda heard about it, he immediately arranged for me to be freed. Even before his official broadcast in 2010 that he was using his position as the executive Governor of Bauchi State to free 28 prisoners from Bauchi Central Prison, I was already a free man along with several of my colleagues” (SJ, 2012). All this goes to confirm the intricate nature of the network of political elites working at their different levels that interconnect to produce complex violent outcomes, making the BH conflict a complex system. If Sani and people like him have such incriminating narratives and claims, I wonder why the law has not caught up with these elites. Impunity is so bad, that the police told Sani after his arrest to shut his mouth with all the evidence he was giving them, or face prolonged detention. What is the president doing about such police collusion with the BH systems by suppressing evidence?

The finance minister Mrs. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, puts it clearly, that Boko Haram, is being stoked by politicians to propagate the violence being witnessed today, these politicians she said, “will use anything to win election” (Babalola, 2014). She adds, “We tend to notice when the electoral cycle comes in, all these things heat up. What we are going through now is democracy in raw form, because people are fighting for power and they will use

anything to get there ... and to win the election,” (Babalola, 2014). This confirms the claims of Sani Haliru that political elites are funding the BH system for their political power, and economic interests. As a professional conflict analyst, I ask questions; is this Boko Haram patronage system?

## **SOMALIZATION OF NIGERIA SYSTEMS**

In 2011, “General Muhammadu Buhari (rtd) did not hide his feelings toward President Jonathan’s presidential ambition as he said, “There may be no Nigeria. I draw parallel with Somalia so many times (Somalisation of Nigeria). I am scared about that. Somalia, they are one ethnic group, one religion, Islam, but for 18 years, Somalia became so selfish, so corrupt, so undisciplined and they have wrecked the country” (Anya, 2012). The tension in the country became very high as some politicians from the North were making inciting statements. Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar was not spared from this bandwagon when he said, “Those who make peaceful change impossible will make violent change inevitable” (thewillnigeria.com, 2014). “The various inciting statements were not made in vain as they were matched with actions. The threat by the Northern politicians to make the country ungovernable for President Goodluck Jonathan was fulfilled with the post-election violence that erupted in some parts of the North which led to the death of some members of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) in Bauchi State. Zonkwa area of Kaduna State was worst hit as more than 300 people were killed during the riot,” (Anya, 2012).

What does Buhari mean by “Somalisation of Nigeria?” Since he threatened it, could there be a grand plan on ground? What are the planned processes they will follow to effect the Somaliasation of Nigeria? Does he mean the present BH mayhems are nothing compared to what they will do in 2015? Does he mean they will make Nigeria desolate, devastated, bullet ridden, bombed out, and destitute? Did he mean there is a designed progressive systems grand plan to terrorize government, and Nigerians aimed at culminating in a coordinated violence, spread across the nation like Somalia, thereby hoping to make the government weak or ineffective, so it will have little practical control over much of the regions? That will result in massive inability, and failure of public services, widespread corruption and criminality; which in turn will create refugees and involuntary movement of populations nationwide, leading to sharp decline of economic activities and inability to provide any sort of security? He clearly says there will be no Nigeria. One wonders why political elites who want to rule Nigeria will want to wipe it out. How will Nigeria be no more? How will he and his network of political elites, and BH remove the nation from the map? How will he rule then? Who will he govern? We want peace; this is not the responsibility of government alone, but the elites as well. How do such threats contribute to peace?

Now that Nigeria has become ungovernable, what should be next? The “bring back our girls” campaign, locally in Nigeria has nothing to do with the girls, but it’s all about those who want power, working hard to claim it from the ones who have it. They will use any means that becomes available to accuse the government and make the nation unstable and ungovernable. The government’s disinterest in negotiating with the militants for the girls is also not about protecting the constitution or the ‘no negotiation with terrorist policy,’ but it’s about those who hold power and want to hang on to it by all means. The Nigerian political opposition is stealing into the pain of the innocent parents of the stolen girls by pushing, the “bring back our girls” campaign, as a political tool to make the government look weak, and bad. If it was an honest campaign, it shouldn’t have been framed “*Bring Back our Girls*” but framed as “*Boko Haram Release our Girls*.” The girls were stolen, and are being held by Boko Haram, not government, so local and international campaigns should be directed at Boko Haram, not the government, who have been doing the most that can be possibly done strategically, and tactically to find, and free the girls. Unfortunately the international community, not understanding the local political dynamics, undertones, and maneuvers, has been deceived by the framing of the political opposition in “*Bring Back our Girls*.” People must stop playing politics with the pain of others.

The arrested generals are only part of the bigger system involved in the Boko Haram conflict. They are one element of the complex arrangement of the systems involved in the pursuit of the final interest of the sponsors – which is to get the president discredited, and rendered unelectable in the next Nigerian elections of 2015. Since the systems behind the conflict are motivated by presidential and other political aspirations, they must function to discredit and render ungovernable the existing system. Each of the arrested generals is a microsystem, in my opinion, they may not all have had the full knowledge of all the other army officers that were part of aiding Boko Haram. The generals are a system on their own, because they each, have their own teams and objectives that are working and pointed at achieving specific tasks that will ultimately converge into the bigger plan of the metaphorical forest. The sponsors of the conflict, the retired generals and business moguls, are rumored to keep all those they use blind to the other people being used. They develop a system around each person that is being used. The individual systems are then manipulated to connect seamlessly to the efforts of the other persons being used for the greater goal. This is done to protect all the actors in the event of an arrest. “In the recent past, the Army and the Defense headquarters have raised the alarm that some of their officers and men are leaking official information to the terrorists and that some of them have been arrested and arraigned before some court-martials in some army divisions in the north... The army officers were said to “have been found guilty of also collaborating with some top politicians in the country to make the country ungovernable for selfish reasons. A lot of re-organization is going on in the military. Many generals will go. Some will be court-martialed and some will be forcefully retired,” he added. “The movement of our troops in the north-east have been leaked to the Boko Haram by many of our colleagues, but the Defense headquarters has realized that and is seriously considering redeployment of some senior officers out of the north-east,” (Leadership, 2014).

This paper intends to discuss the different systems involved and how these systems are organized to achieve the Boko Haram systems political conflict objectives, and outcome. Nothing in the conflict is really what it looks like in the press, and the overt phase. The covert phase is really full of self-important people in Nigeria scheming to achieve their political and feudalistic goals.

## **NIGERIAN GENERALS FOUND GUILTY OF ARMING BOKO HARAM**

Michelle Faul (2014) an associated press reporter, writing from Kaduna, Nigeria, says “Ten generals and five other senior military officers were found guilty in court-martials of providing arms and information to Boko Haram extremists, a leading Nigerian newspaper reported Tuesday.”

Prior to this, months ago, as at June 2014, locally in Nigeria, there were very strong allegations from politicians, and soldiers that, senior officers were helping the Islamic extremists; and that some lower ranking soldiers even fight alongside the insurgents at the orders of the commanding officers (Associated Press, 2014), and then return to their army barracks. The information provided by these army officers helped the Boko Haram militants to ambush military convoys in pursuit of militants; and also enabling the militants attack army barracks, and garrisons in the Northeastern part of the nation. This is of critical importance as it operationalizes the system of rendering the nation ungovernable. The appropriate government response therefore should include holding the generals accountable for treason and its consequences.

According to other news information, army officers are also saying that four other officers, beside the 15, were also court martialled and found guilty of “being disloyal and for working for the sect,” (Washington Post, 2014). The ministry of Defense through its spokesperson, Major General Chris Olukolade has made spurious efforts to hide this matter. Governments usually cover things up to make sure investigations and actions are fully carried out before bringing the matter out to the public, so their silence doesn’t necessarily mean the story isn’t true. It is a major blow to the army that ten of its *generals* and five senior officers and may be even much more yet to be fished out, would be involved in such a disgraceful deed.

Before this revelation, Boko Haram had earlier in April 15, kidnapped almost 300 schoolgirls, of whom 272 remain captive as at May 2014, by this, they incurred the wrath of the international community, and UN sanctions. However, after the court martial, the 15 army officers who were said to have been among many more being tried at divisional level have been referred to the Defense headquarters in Abuja, the federal capital of Nigeria for final determination. It will be good to recall that President Goodluck Jonathan last year, confessed that he believed some members of the military, and even some of his cabinet members sympathized with Boko Haram, or even out-rightly belonged to the sect (Washington Post, 2014). It will be helpful to note that the turn in events that led to the discovery and arrest of the military officers, was the intervention of the NSA U.S. styled intelligence collection from phone communications. The Nigerian military campaign against Boko Haram has been on now for over five years, with no definite discoveries, except direct militarized confrontation with Boko haram. Sometimes in 2013, government backed this effort with a state of emergency in the flashpoint states, but this has failed to end the incessant attacks, which essentially have been on the increase till date. In January 2014, President Jonathan retired his entire military top leadership, followed by the replacement of the defense minister.

## **GAMES AND INTRIGUES**

It has been unfortunate that Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s government has been harshly analyzed as being weak, irresponsible, and lethargic. However, the mix of the complexity of the political and militancy systems makes it really difficult for President Goodluck Jonathan to have a good handle on the most effective intervention system necessary to deal the death blow to the militant’s systems, and their supporting systems of sponsors, sympathizers, and suppliers. The President is under snowballing burden to negotiate with the terrorists, who are demanding a prisoner exchange for the kidnapped girls. In a fighting situation like the Boko Haram conflict, professional negotiators will agree, that it is a win, win, for both sides to negotiate. Government will get the girls back, while Boko Haram gets its fighters, but such fighters may thereafter re-enter the war front, and may ultimately be killed by security forces, so Boko Haram has gained but lost. So negotiation with Boko Haram in this case, whichever way one looks at it, it is productive for the kidnapped girls, their parents, and the government. Government should therefore never fail to seize every opportunity to negotiate. Revolutions happen when there are no means of negotiation and idea sharing between the government and its population; so the unhappy population emerges, and revolutions become inevitable.

Institutions and information constitute the foundation of society. Negotiations provide information about anticipated behavior of social actors, informal conventions and norms are created in the process which helps to stabilize social expectations and also structure social life. Because such informal conventions and norms become self-enforcing; however, the efficacy of these conventions depend on the extent to which social actors find it in their self-interest to comply. The stability of such negotiations may also be affected by challenges of information delivery. These challenges include, (i) lack of shared knowledge of norms, (ii) ambiguity of communicated and tacit information and expectations, and (iii) when information and negotiated conventions, are liable to multiple interpretations, or the size of any of the group is too large and complex to adequately and effectively dialog with. Said another way, cooperation is difficult to sustain when one of the parties has an end game in mind; when information on one party is lacking, and when there are large numbers of players in that team, and they are unknown. However, progressive people find it worthwhile cooperating with others when the game is repeated, that is without an end game in mind, when they possess all the information about the other player’s past performance, and when there



are small numbers of players on that side who can be known or transacted with. One needs to have repeated dealings with the other party to know the other party well, and deal with a small number of the other side. In life, cooperative behavior is seen when people have repeated dealings and interactions and have a great deal of information about each other and when small numbers characterize the other people (North, 1990). Putting all this in context, Boko Haram has attempted dialog with government before, but when they saw that there was an end game in mind to arrest their representatives, they made up their minds never again to attempt dialog. Government on the other hand, has problem with knowing who BH really is; their real number, and members, why they do not want to commit to permanent dialog and peace, nor does the government have all the information needed to understand BH. They have too much hidden or tacit information. Tacit knowledge and communicable knowledge (North, 1990) impact invariably on negotiation outcomes, and must be managed creatively. Tacit knowledge is that knowledge that can only be partially communicated; it is acquired in practice and experience. It has its overt and covert phases. Understanding this in negotiation transactions, can be key, to affecting the conflict dynamics. No war is fought entirely from the book; most are executed by tacit and covert knowledge, and the ingenuity, and resourcefulness of the fighters. Even with practice, there can be immense difference in levels of the understanding of tacit knowledge. So is the situation in negotiation. Communicable knowledge is knowledge communicated from person to person overtly. This is the basic level of communication in negotiations.

There are many hypocritical political games and intrigues at play. The game theory displayed in the recent strategic decision making using all kinds of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers creating the present zero-sum political competition between the president and his opposition, such that opposition's gains are conceived to be exactly equal net losses of the other. The political wits of the Nigerian politicians are being heavily tested with this new survivalist idea of mixed-strategy equilibria in two-person zero-sum games. When these strategies are employed, no player can profit by unilaterally deviating from his strategy; however, when one fails to support its strategy with functional workable action, then the winner emerges by holding steady to his strategies. But where the equilibria is maintained a stalemate or stability of the state can result. If the opposition and the Boko Haram strategists keep pushing as they are, and the government or President Goodluck Jonathan doesn't play his system's strategy well, he will be floored and wiped out. But if he does what will work, he will both stabilize the government systems and wipe out the Boko Haram system and its gang of supporters. Nevertheless, the Nigerian masses, that the political class pretends to be trying to protect by its actions, and hopes to rule, is being decimated city by city, and state by state. They have become the proverbial grass that gets hurt when two elephants fight. They might soon be forced to join the fight to avoid getting permanently hurt, or wiped out. Because in all political violence examples of the past, the masses get fed up at a stage, and begin to take their fate into their hands, then a revolution results. This never can be predicted as to its direction, nor gains, only losses. With the level the Boko Haram systemized conflict has been allowed to flourish, "because of feedback delays within the complex 'government' systems, the time a problem becomes apparent, it may be unnecessarily difficult to solve – a stitch in time saves nine," (Meadows, 2008, p. 3). This underscores the validity of the president taking action now that will work, and not just make fair speeches. If he keeps making fair speeches instead of arresting the real sponsors behind the situation, "according to the competitive exclusion principle, if a reinforcing feedback loop rewards the winner of a competition with the means to win further competitions, the result will be the elimination of all but a few competitors" (Meadows, 2008, p. 3). When this happens, the state fails, and the strong alone survive and therefore own the nation. Which confirms the saying of the Bible, "For he that hath, to him shall be given: and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath" Mark 4:25 or putting it another way, the rich get richer.

## **BOKO HARAM – A DELIBERATE CREATION**

Boko Haram was deliberately created, and it will take deliberate, informed, definite, and targeted action to terminate it. Its accomplishments are more than the sum of the individual parts. It is interconnected, coherently organized in a way to achieve the goals of the sponsors and benefactors. Contextualizing the accomplishment of the system being more than the sum of the individual parts, is like a problem solving situation, when one puts two groups of problem solvers, one group is homogenous, and the other is diverse. They are then asked to solve a problem, the sum of the solution to be provided by the homogenous group will be the same by the time one aggregates their found solutions, their optima can only be one, because they are operating from the same perspective and heuristics. But when the solutions from the diversity group are aggregated, one discovers the results are higher, because they came with different perspectives and heuristics on the problem, and so made diverse discoveries leading to higher performance. In like manner, a system is a diversity that can produce greater, higher, and more complex results, as compared to the individual parts (which are homogenous) working on their own, and producing individual results that will be limited and of low quality. In the sense, "diversity trumps homogeneity and diversity trumps ability" (Page, 2007, p. 152-153). "The diversity trumps homogeneity theorem says, if two collections of problem solvers contain problem solvers of equal individual ability, and if those problem solvers in the first collection are homogeneous, and those in the second group are diverse, that is, they have some differences in their local optima, then the collection of diverse problem solvers, on the average, outperforms the collection of the homogeneous problem solvers" (Page, 2007, p. 157). This is so because the homogeneous problem solvers are all of the same optima, so the expected value of a solution located by the collection of agents cannot be better than that of the individual. Whereas the local optima of the diverse group are very diverse, so if one problem solver gets stuck at one local optima, another problem solver will find a new and higher solution, improving on the first local optima. This is why systems are always preferred to

individual action. The combined interconnected action of the parts together, produce greater output as compared to the cumulative aggregate of the individual parts put together. Systems performance never reach global optimum because of lack of diversity, there is always a new local optima to look at with diversity. Diversity in systems creates iterative or feedback loop improvements. “And these improvements continue until the collections finds a solution that lies in the intersection of the local optima for all of the problem” (Page, 2007, p. 157). Soccer teams are a system that can produce goals when all the player’s perspectives and heuristics are combined. But the individual players left alone, may never score goals. In like manner, the BH system is like a soccer team, with club owners, sponsors, coaches, technical advisers, players, the ball and the field. You may never discover the sponsors, but you can see the players, the ball and the field. The players are the Boko haram fighters and the government security forces, the ball is the masses, and the field is Nigeria. But behind all these elements are those whose interest, and benefits the football team serves. As long as the players get their paltry benefits, they will do anything to satisfy the sponsors. They have laws that govern the team’s operations; and the coach, and technical adviser’s strategies and tactics for winning the game are all laid out covertly within the system. They have communication systems, and motions that are predictable and simple to use to produce complex results. The simplicity of a system is what is creating the illusion that the BH conflict is just between what is known at surface between Boko Haram and government; not the complex underwork, interconnected network of intentional destroyers that undergird the fighters to produce the visible violent effects. A keen Boko Haram event observer can see a lot of interconnections between the networks that function to produce the outcomes that are seen as displayed in the events and atrocities all around Northern and Central Nigeria. There is a noticeable mechanism, and an integrity or wholeness of the system as shown in the difficulty the security operatives have to pick the BH systems apart. The system is self-organizing and self-repairing. This is why when Mohammed Yusuf was gunned down, they quickly self-organized themselves, and repaired the breeches, and became even more daring than they have ever been. The resolution of the conflict is to look beyond the players (Boko haram fighters, footmen and operatives) to the rules of the game and the proxies behind the rules.

In the meantime, while the BH systems are razing villages, kidnapping and raping women, and decimating populations, the political elites behind all the atrocities are sitting behind the scenes and wringing their hands in pleasure, waiting to seize the moment to win the 2015 elections. The complexity of the situation does not allow any credible theory to be put forward to convince the world that the non-recovery of the kidnapped girls, and the protractedness of the BH terrorism has nothing to do with weakness of the government but a carefully networked complex system that is functioning seamlessly like a piece of machine to hurt Nigerians, and embarrass the government. This system arrangement makes it so hard for the girls to be found and rescued. If your enemy understands systems theory, technically or theoretically, and you don’t, you are in for big trouble.

According to Laszlo (2002), Human nature is a system of behaviors, dispositions and even the subconscious. Though some theories in opposition to atomism and behaviorism see humans as a black box which correlates with stimuli and responses, however, conflict systems like that of Boko Haram link humans and the world they live in so intimately, that it is difficult to discern them apart. Humans emerge in whatever world space they live, reflecting its general characteristics. The human is a social role carrier by work, with inborn political interests, and benefits only known to him that force him to sell his conscience, even in the convincing evidence against his better judgment like the case of the court martialled generals. By conscious personality, the human is a double-faced link, integrating and coordinating the biological and social worlds of friends and foes. This allows a soldier (like the 15 arrested and court martialled generals and officers) paid with tax payer’s money, to betray the nation, by working for the enemy. They should have been protecting the masses since they were being paid with national funds, and not careen to the opposition or its militant’s system. Anyhow, such is the unpredictability of humanness, dispositions, and the behaviors of his nature. The human is the coordinating interface system in the multi-level holarchy of his political nature. This complex political nature intertwined in the Boko Haram conflict is an undiscernible, intricate, overt and covert system of conflict. This makes the intractable conundrum like Boko Haram, unreadable, and almost impossible to deal with. To know one part of the system, we must know something about that remarkable slice of reality which, instead of running down, keeps winding up in the conflict nature. On the multi-level, systems interact with systems, and collaboratively form Supra systems. The human being and his activities is a part of that grand palace of great complexity of detail, however, if the conflict systems involving humans is well read; it could be of sweeping simplicity and order in overall design. All parts express the character of the whole, yet all parts are not the same. We can see the character of the BH systems in any attack they carry out. So, if leaders take the time to understand one of the systems in the conflict, it will decode the rest of the hidden systems. This is the systems concept of nature, and it is pre-condition to coming to know the humans involved in the Boko Haram conflict.

## **16 BOKO HARAM OPERATIONAL SYSTEMS AND FEEDBACK LOOPS**

This paper proposes that, the grand plan or forest of the Boko Haram conflict is that, political elites anticipate to use the Boko Haram terrorism to mobilize a simultaneous coordinated nationwide expression of violence when the plans, things, and arrangements are ripe, and the time is due, to bring the government to a standstill, and possible collapse, where an interim government would become forcibly necessary. The coordinated nationwide violence will make the central government so weak or ineffective, that it will have little practical control over the regions. The nation becomes ungovernable, resulting in general government inability and non-provision of public services, widespread corruption and criminality results; which in turn will create refugees and involuntary movement of populations leading to sharp economic decline, and inability to provide public services. Of course, when the state

fails or is weakened, it is not able to interact with other states as a full member of the international community; neither will it be able to have the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in its boundaries, due to the erosion of the power of the legitimate authority to make collective decisions. This situation will be preferred by the political opposition so as to have an interim national leadership heading government to supervise the 2015 elections, instead of President Goodluck Jonathan. However, if this grand plan is not accomplished before 2015 elections, and President Goodluck wins the election, the grand plan will still be carried over into the next tenure of his government, till according General Buhari, “the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood, and disgraced out of office.” In a sense, if I can’t get it, we’ll all lose it or the nation will perish. A Hausa proverb says “a taru, a ruba,” meaning let’s all be losers. The nation should dissolve and be obliterated, not just disintegrate, but decompose, and become history.

To understand how the Boko Haram system parts interact to produce results, see figure 2: Boko Haram Systems Feedback loops. Reading these systems involved in the Boko Haram conflict, I have come out with a complex diversity of networks, activities and personalities, working together to make all the horrible events happening like the kidnap of the almost 300 girls, daily burning of churches, and the bombing of strategic locations in different cities to be sustained, so as to achieve the grand plan or master plot. From already known intelligence, facts, attacks, and events, I developed the following diagram in Figures 1 below, showing how the Boko Haram strategic and tactical systems are operationalized. This system arrangement shouldn’t be confused with its leadership structure.

## Boko Haram Operational system




FIGURE 1

In Figure 2, I try to analyze how the Boko Haram strategic and tactical systems’ feedback loops are operationalized to achieve change over time to create patterns and predictabilities, making the working of the systems simple, out of the complexity of the arrangements and structures.

## Boko Haram Systems FeedBackLoops




FIGURE 2

FIGURE 2 LEGEND: Boko Haram Systems Feedback loops

Feedback means to change over time.

A loop is a means to change curve, it forms a partly closed or open curve within itself through which other change actions can be processed to create change hooks or may be hooked to other change initiatives.

*Stabilizing Loop* also simply means change that stabilizes outflows in a system's continuum of activities over time. Stabilizing loops are used to compensate for losses and used up energy.

**Feedback Loop 1**= Perceived successes of Boko Haram, Government Reaction, Public Reaction

**Feedback loop 2** = Feedback loop 1 excites further performance from Elites, Sponsors, Generals etc. From the perceived successes, a network of outcomes emerge that pump adrenaline into fighters, turbo charging them on, in search for greater successes.

**Stabilizing Loop 1**= As the attack teams come back with success, the militants are revived and feel invincible. Media coverage gives the necessary oxygen to thrive, recover and reproduce

**Stabilizing Loop 2**= From the perceived successes, strategies are made for new attacks by fighters. They sometimes decide on their own to attack depending on the dynamics of any attack. If they encounter resistance and lose some fighters, they may go in rampage mode and cause more damage than their sponsors required.

**Stabilizing Loop 3** = Self-enablement, recovery loops, and recruitment strategies

**Outflow** = The direction of empowerment. It should be noted that all strategies, attack decisions and reactions to outcomes are decided from the beginning of the outflow channels of command - Elites, Sponsors, and Generals, etc.

The Boko Haram strategic and tactical systems can be explained as shown in Figures 1 and 2. Each of the networks below is a system of its own, because it takes many interconnected interactions to achieve the results the networks entails. The identified 16 systems are:

- ✚ *Network of political elites who control and instigate* the Boko Haram system's different elements. (Boko Haram grand master and fighters work to satisfy their strategic political interests and plans). They believe their political and economic ambitions, interests and goals can't be reached without violence since the President Goodluck Jonathan won't give up power. Like Alhaji Atiku Abubakar said, "Those who make peaceful change impossible will make violent change inevitable" (thewillnigeria.com, 2014). He meant something concrete; it was no empty threat, but a statement along with that of other political elites, with a back-up grand plan. What is happening in Nigeria today is the fulfilment of this threat, operationalizing '...violent change.'
- ✚ *Network of Sponsors*: This network of people, finance, protect and support the conflict system any way necessary (these include financial and strategic partners, moral sympathizers and organizers of hideouts in target cities). These will include state governors (Jamgbadi, 2014), Senators (Saharareporters, 2011), members of the House of Representatives (Admin, undated), federal ministers, military, police, and other security agency personnel (BBC report, 2012). Sponsors have their interests, and grievances against the present government or President. Some state governors were known at one time to pay monthly dues from their monthly budgetary allocations to Boko Haram systems, to lubricate their operations and keep the fighters from initiating any violence in the governor's domain (Manchy7531, 2012). The support of security operatives was obvious in the escape of Kabiru Sokoto, a Boko Haram chieftain from police detention (SaharaReporters, 2012). President Goodluck Jonathan said: "The saboteurs in government condoning terrorism by Boko Haram, you do not love this nation. Those of you, who leak secrets to Boko Haram, do not love this nation. It is a crime not to love this nation...Some continue to dip their hands and eat with you and you won't even know the person who will point a gun at you, or plant a bomb behind your house" (Opeseitan, 2013). Who dips into the same plate with the President, but his cabinet pillars?
- ✚ *Network of Businesses* that toil to churn out money for Boko Haram activities, which include bank robberies, bank operatives. Army officers, some state governors (Jamgbadi, 2014), senators, members of the House of Representatives, and ministers are rumored to be collaborating to fund the militants. Sanusi Lamido Sanusi former Central Bank Governor (CBN) has been sued to court by the federal government for corruption since February 2014. He is charged with financial recklessness while in office as the CBN governor (Aribisala, 2014). According to Aribisala (2014) Sanusi is "accused by the federal government of running the accounts of the CBN like a bull in a china shop. It is only in Nigeria that you can have a Central Bank governor spend government money as outrageously and as whimsically as Sanusi is alleged to have done. Government revealed that Sanusi gave away nothing less than ₦163 billion in 63 unauthorized personal "intervention projects" in different parts of the country." The monies are suspected to have been used to support the Boko Haram terrorism.
- ✚ *Network of Arm factories* that have been discovered in different parts of the nation for the manufacture of weapons and bombs. This network also includes arm suppliers and weapon entrepreneurs. Army officers, police, immigration and customs officers (NigerianWatch, 2014) are suspected as profiteering, or collaborating with the trading of weapons with the militants. Operators of shopping malls or supermarkets (Premium Times, 2013), some governor's farms, and state government houses (Jamgbadi, 2014), etc. are also known to be used as warehouses for weapons, and other war equipment for supplies to Boko Haram fighters. Police are used to protect convoys transporting these weapons across the country to locations where they are needed, using petrol tankers, army trucks, and official government vehicles, Lorries carrying farm produce, and Newspaper distribution trucks are also known to be used.
- ✚ *Network of developers of Ideologies and framing of conflict issues*; ideological framing of issues are necessary for recruitment of fighters, and mobilizing the media front. Framing allows the BH system to be perceived as legitimate, and just Nigerians who have grievances. Boko Haram uses television, radio, print, and social media as its oxygen to survive, to terrorize both its political opponents, targets, and the general public. Some Army officers, state governors, senators, members of the House of Representatives (Saharareporters, 2011), (Admin, undated), judges, police, immigration and customs officers (NigerianWatch, 2014) are also suspected as being sympathetic with, and endorsing the ideologies and sentiments of Boko Haram.



- ✚ *The network of the Grand leader of Boko Haram*, known to be Abubakar Shekau. Some Army officers, state governors (Siollun, 2014), senators, members of the House of Representatives (Saharareporters, 2011), (Admin, undated), police, immigration, and customs officers (NigerianWatch, 2014) are rumored to be in cahoots with Abubakar Shekau. Shekau himself may not understand the full implications of what he is made to do. He may only be seeing the trees not the forest. He thinks he is smart, but he is only being used by the rich and powerful.
- ✚ *Splinter groups or cells* that lay claim to Boko Haram. These are located in different local domains that they ‘claim’ to control covertly. For an outsider to operate as an insurgent in that location, he must connect with the existing splinter groups or face a stiff prizefight to form his own franchise. They all have interest in making money from the sponsors and sympathizers of Boko Haram. So everyone starts his own small Boko Haram franchise splinter group like the Ansaru, and gets funded by political elites who use them to fan political disunity, and disaffection among the regions, and personalities in the nation. Some political elites, including state governors, senators, members of the House of Representatives, are *rumored* to use the Boko Haram multiple splinter groups for assassinating political opponents (Siollun, 2014). The assassination attempt on the life of the late Emir of Kano was a good example of targeted killings (Ross, 2013). It has become popular to see headlines like this “Kano House of Assembly Member assassinated by unknown gunmen” (Elombah.com, 2013). Who are these unknown gun men, and who sent them? Why did the sender send them? Other headlines could read “Boko Haram attacks and kills politician...” The recent assassination of the Emir of Gwoza is another very good example of reducing leaders who speak up against terrorism (SaharaReporters, 2014). According to Iguisi (2014) “over the years, death threats and political assassinations have been on the increase. The list of politically motivated killings is by no means exhaustive, it is endless.” Fighters are also used to possibly reduce the opposition’s political populations or supporters in cities, or areas where a politician would want to win elections but doesn’t have the majority. Once the populations of people who are not favorable to the candidate or political party are attacked, and forced to flee en masse from the city or area, it becomes a lot easier for the politician and his party to now win elections in the region. The systematic and intentional decimation of the Christian population and their businesses and places of worship in Maiduguri was meant to remove the Christian support base of a particular party from Maiduguri and other areas of Borno and Yobe states. Most Christian settlements in these two states have been systematically destroyed and their people killed, and their homes and businesses taken over by Muslims. Eyewitnesses inform me that Maiduguri has lost over 2000 Christian worship places to Boko Haram, Damaturu also lost over 500 Christian worship places to same attacks. There is little or no Christian presence in most towns and villages in the affected areas where they used to be the majority in the two states. Political elites from these states have always been baffled that during national elections, Christian candidates always got large number of votes in these mostly Muslim states, so the best way to deal with the problem in preparation for 2015 elections, was to clear the Christian population! They have succeeded, because no one is doing anything to return the Christians back to their homes in these areas. Those who have been killed can’t be resurrected back, neither are those IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) being actively prepared to return.
- ✚ *Network of Commanders* – These are the platoon chiefs who are suspected to include Nigerians and Arabs (Karmon, 2014) (under Shekau, and the different splinter group leaders) recruited from West and North Africa (Danfulani, 2014), Saudi Arabia, Iran etc. (Wikileaks, 2014, #179). Relatives of eyewitnesses that I interviewed, who witnessed attacks in villages in Benue and Nasarawa states by Boko Haram, say some of the militants were fair skinned like ‘white people,’ confirming the rumors that Arabs were helping Boko Haram. With the use of chemical weapons employed in some of the Benue and Nasarawa state attacks (NAN, 2014), Boko Haram would need people who have experience with such weapons to deploy them like people from Libya etc. where such weapons have been manufactured and used.
- ✚ *Network of Recruiters* who go round Nigeria, some West, and North African nations, recruiting fighters for the different splinter groups of Boko Haram (Fessy, 2014). Each camp or splinter group has its recruiters. To entice unsuspecting youths, they tell recruits that there is Jihad in Nigeria (Wikileaks, 2014, #179), so they are needed to help fellow Muslims. It is rumored that fighters are paid between \$3000 to \$5000 per person, renewable after 3-6 months of fighting (Fessy, 2014). “In August 2012 the Imam of the Grand Mosque in Bignona, southern Senegal, claimed that Boko Haram was recruiting local youths. There are indications that BH has recruited some militants from neighboring countries. Mamman Nur—believed to be second in command to Shekau—is from Chad, while Abubakar Kilam and Ali Jalingo, responsible for major attacks in the northeastern Borno State, are said to be from Niger” (Karmon, 2014).
- ✚ *The Network of Fighters* is the frontline conflagration. These are the militants being used to burn down whole villages, and conduct suicide bombings, and killings in cities and villages. They network their attacks, switching places for convenience, and talk to each other for reconnaissance, gaining vital information about the next sorties and locations. This feedback loop, allows them to morph and stay invincible. Between the 1980s to late 1990s, unqualified Muslims youths were recruited in their thousands into the Nigerian army; it was reported openly in Nigeria then that after going through all the trainings, over 20% of these well trained Nigerian soldiers would not report to their primary places of assignment after postings. Where did they go, and where are they today? Many believe they are now part of the very skilled BH fighters that dress in military uniforms, and fight against Nigeria and its people. I was involved in local struggles to raise awareness against this anomaly in military recruitments during the 1980s, so I speak with the authority of a participant in the situation. These Boko Haram strategies have been in the making for decades, in anticipation for the time the North would not be able to get back to power, so

they can unleash mayhem in a religiously coated political violence to destabilize the nation and probably seize power forcibly in a northern led military coup.

✚ *Network of Intelligence squads.* Boko Haram uses mainly HUMINT to gather intelligence from the nation. These human agents pose as car, motorbike or spare part traders (Adepegba, 2014), freelance vegetable sellers, newspaper vendors, 'suya' meat-joint operators, banana hawkers, 'mai-shayi' (in Nigeria, they hawk tea), shoe shiners, cleaners, etc.; others pose as operators of shopping malls, and supermarkets etc. The agents loiter in the local community and special interest areas they are assigned, eavesdropping, to know what the people are saying. Those who set up the above businesses near sensitive government offices, give free meat or whatever sale-ware favors to officers and their men. By this, they gain access into very secured offices or compounds, since they personally supply the food or their sale-wares to the gullible, so called 'important officers,' they are able to thereby eavesdrop on what such government set-up is up to; they then make friends with officers and penetrate more deeply into required Intel. These infiltrators are good in warming their way into their target's favors. Remember, there are military generals and highly placed police officers involved in the espionage system, so they adequately train such agents. The agents therefore act from strategic knowledge of how to infiltrate; they don't operate on a trial and error basis. In the past five years, there has been a major proliferation around the country of these categories of agents, acting under the above covers. They look so unintelligent, that one could give them away for illiterates and nincompoops. All intelligence gathered are leg ran to avoid government wire intelligence, the data is sent to the control command of the agent, then to the strategic leaders. Data is processed by the hierarchy, and used for strategic target designs or determination for physical attacks, bombing, or suicide attacks. This is how Imams or leading religious, or government figures that preach or make comments against Boko Haram are identified and eliminated, or their mosques or homes bombed. The agents collect Intel on how, when, and where to get the person or target, either by assassination or suicide bombing. After the data is fully analyzed, the attack then follows. Targets are ranked based on their significance to government and the public – the bombing of the Abuja bus terminal, the Churches around the North, the crowded street in Jos etc., are all good examples of how intelligence was used to inflict the highest death toll, pain, and impact on the public and government. This in turn makes the public cry against the government for not doing enough to secure the nation, which invariably leads to dissatisfaction and rejection of the government, especially the President. This all plays into the grand plan of discrediting the government and president into losing the 2015 elections, and power shifting to a Muslim. The Jos street bombing, where over 200 people were said to have died, was a job done after very careful traffic intelligence and data analysis. The location of the bombing is most notorious for traffic hold ups in Jos; the agents must have surveyed, and calculated or determined that, that was the most victim intensive traffic jam in Jos to detonate a bomb. This is but a simple example of how Boko Haram uses HUMINT to facilitate their attack plans. Adepegba (2014) confirms the arrest of Babuji Ya'ari, a Boko haram HUMINT agent who spearheaded the kidnap of the almost 300 Chibok girls and the recent targeted killing of the Emir of Gwoza. To cover his HUMINT work, he joined the civilian JTF, which he used as protection to carry on spying unsuspectingly. The Director, Defense Information, Maj. Gen. Chris Olukolade in Abuja on Monday June 30<sup>th</sup> 2014, said the suspect's main role in the group was to spy and gather information for the terrorists group. "Babuji has been coordinating several deadly attacks in Maiduguri since 2011, including the daring attacks on Customs and military locations, as well as the planting of IEDs in several locations in the town... Olukolade said the arrest of the businessman who is known to deal in tricycles, has also yielded some vital information and facilitated the arrest of other members of the terrorists' intelligence cell who are women." BH is said to have hundreds of these Babuji Ya'ari style spy cells all around the nation, who are being paid monthly salaries by different political elites to service the BH's need for information, for its system's multi-utilitarian goals and activities. It may be very necessary to watch all the Chibok kidnapped girls when they are finally released, including those who presently claim to have escaped from the BH camps, they may have been turned into spies and informants; because BH knows they may meet or reach high government officials after their release or even the President.

✚ *Network of Counterintelligence players,* made up of moles in the different security agencies who steal information from security formations, and pass on to the sect, who then analyze for onward performance. Army officers, police, immigration, and customs officers are rumored to work as counterintelligence operatives for Boko Haram. The lead story of this paper (Leadership, 2014) is a sure proof of internal betrayal of government's efforts to curb the terrorists by its own army. Army officers sell or transmute intelligence to Boko Haram hierarchy. They don't feel they are serving Abubakar Shekau who is the media face and the grand master of BH, but the political elites who command the moves from their residences. Abubakar Shekau himself is a pawn in the hands of these elites.

✚ *Networks of Informants* in cities and villages. There are very serious networks of informant build-up around the country, which is beyond the capacity of the Boko Haram grand master Shekau to organize. In my view, political elites use their political machinery to organize these informants to report on reactions from the population to identify those speaking up against the terrorism; they also identify locations for bombing or attacks that can inflict the gravest pain. They also discover the plans of vigilante groups set up against Boko Haram. This is how Muslim leaders who speak up against Boko Haram are discovered and eliminated. Some Army officers, state governors, senators, members of the House of Representatives, police, immigration and customs officers are also *rumored* to be leg runners clearing targets to be attacked, and people to be humiliated or eliminated.

✚ *Strategies and tactical scheme formation, and organization of targeted strikes.* The militants are supported by military know-how from Army officers to determine high stake targets in the nation that will inflict the gravest



damage, impact, and deadliest blows to both the president and the people. Military tacticians, police, immigration and customs officers are known and have been published by Nigerian newspapers at different times as helping in laying attack tactics and ambush strategies against the police and army with BH.

- ✚ *Network of Targeted attacks:* These are the actual attack events and engagements that build up to synchronized attacks, and well-coordinated feedback loops with the contacts on ground in the target cities. Attacks are well coordinated, and fighters and agents clean up any evidence that can be used to trace them.
- ✚ *Network of targeted outcomes strategized to create cumulative damages.* I argue that attacks are strung up to give a cumulative effect, so each attack builds on the impact of last, all aimed at making specific statements, either as a response to a current happening in the nation, or targeted at some future gain. Rumors filtering out locally in Nigeria indicate that Boko Haram attacks, are planned to build on one another, on an incremental basis toward the 2015 elections, they plan to make these events look like natural confusion, inter-ethnic conflicts causing national unrest, resulting in general violence. They like to make their attacks look like ethnic groups are in conflict with one another, so the killings can never be traced to BH. Fulani's are blamed unfortunately in like manner for such attacks, yet, the damages, weapons, and tactics used, are beyond the scope, predictability, and pattern of a regular Fulani/ethnic struggle for grazing land. The Tiv/Alago conflict in Nasarawa and Benue states are camouflaged BH agent attacks, not Fulani or ethnic conflict. It's part of the grand plan to make the nation insecure and ungovernable. The camouflaged Tiv/Jukun conflict in Taraba and Benue states are not ethnic struggles but the same BH agents camouflaged attacks. The Hausa/Southern Kaduna ethnic situation is also sustained by BH element's camouflaged attacks. They all bear the signature of BH splinter group attacks. They come in pick-ups, well- armed, they arrive suddenly, the weapons they carry are heavy duty arms, they sometimes use Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), work with the element of surprise, attack with military precision, because they have the requisite training, and tactical, and technical know-how to use sophisticated weapons. They shoot to kill at the right body parts, like snipers/marksmen, or people who have received rigorous training for the purpose. Some of their fighters are light skinned, and may wear military fatigues. In contrast, ethnic conflicts don't normally involve such heavy weapons, nor surprise moves, and military precision attacks; they can't shoot at the right body points to kill, because they lack that requisite training, and systemized skills or tactics. But the so-called Fulani attacks (by BH agents) are well planned, systemized linkages of attacks, not just random events; they interconnect with one another, to build on themselves, to create greater impact of fear and insecurity. They are targeted intentionally at specific high stake locations; to give an impression of restiveness, and general insecurity, as has been happening in the physical violence occurring in towns, villages and cities in Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, Bauchi, Kaduna, and Kano states and the Federal Capital Territory. The bomb blasts and consequential death tolls that follow in these locations and elsewhere in the nation are not random; they are targeted to achieve specific impact, and strike at some perceived power structures that mean much to the government and the Christian community which is regarded as the President's constituency. Therefore Nigerians must be careful calling all the fighting between the so-called Fulani herdsmen, and the different ethnic groups around the Nation, whether North or South as Fulani attacks, instead of BH strategic attacks. However, it may be possible, and even plausible to fix the Fulani ethnic group in the BH attacks, because general Buhari, who promised that 'the dog and monkey will all be covered in blood,' is of the Fulani ethnic extraction. So it may be argued that, the Fulani's are fighting in support of their kinsman? In any case, the Boko Haram system has been so strategically streamlined with all kinds of camouflages, that it is impossible to understand who is doing these targeted killings. BH agents appear as Fulani to the Tiv in Benue state, and same to the Alago and Eggon of Nasarawa state; they arrive as Fulani to the Jukun in Tarabba state and elsewhere. To the Birom in Plateau state, they arrive as Fulani dressed in Army fatigues. This is why every agreement made with the Miyate Allah Association leaders never seems to work to curb the Fulani attacks in any part of the nation, because they have no control over what is happening, since it is not real Fulanis doing the attacks. Government may go on meeting and negotiating with the Fulani cattle rearers association from now till they all drop dead, and the attacks will not end, because those informing the attacks are the BH sponsors and their agents, not the Fulanis. These BH agents live and move among the Fulanis, who are so simple minded, that their simplicity can be overridden by the BH agents. In the yester years, long ago, in the South, Fulani herdsmen have always visited the south with their cattle for sale; they take the cows out for brief grazing within the area till the cows are sold, before they return back to the North, but they were then never being known to cause the wanton damage and struggle for graving land among the local communities like the present day camouflaged Fulani (BH agents) are unleashing on local populations. These so-called Fulanis' are no Fulanis at all; they are Boko Haram using cows as cover, to legitimize their purpose of going all over the nation. Are the Fulanis so organized that they are daring to take on the nation and the different ethnicities all at the same time? It takes a group that knows what it is doing strategically to attack every ethnic group all around the country at the same time as is happening today in Nigeria. Boko haram alone has such capability. Fulani herdsmen don't. I suggest that the Fulani ethnic group of today is not that strategic, and do not have the forum to ferment the coordinated nationwide crisis like is being witnessed. What can be the aim for such campaigns by the Fulanis? To conquer grazing land? To gather shame and disapproval from their fellow Nigerians? If I know the Fulani man well enough, in his simplicity, he doesn't want to live in conflict, since he knows how that will affect his livelihood – the cows. All he cares about is his cows, not land, or taking over government. But the infiltration of the BH agents amongst the Fulani camps nationwide, will not allow the immediately discernment of who the 'Fulani' causing the problems may be. Yes, they look and talk Fulani, but

what kind of Fulani is he? BH has found the Fulani camps and movement across the Nigerian wildernesses as the most convenient way of shipping their weapons across the nation undetected. When last did one see any check point in the bush, where the Fulanis migrate, checking for weapons? Which check point do they have to pass through for check-up? Millions of arms move through the bushes from the South to North and the North to South through those bushes daily while the Nigerian security is napping or busy wasting time at the checkpoints on intercity roads. BH is too strategic to take weapons through the main high ways, except what can't go through the Fulani cow paths. Government must devise a means of creating mobile military check points for all bush migration of the Fulani cows. Unfortunately for the Fulani ethnic group, their God given simplicity allows them to accept anyone who professes Islam into their camps without necessary scrutiny; and before they know it, they become unwittingly complicit with the BH conflict. Government must develop training models that will help the Fulani herdsmen nationwide to identify BH agents and how to resist their infiltration. Government should step back, and not stereotype the Fulani ethnic group for trouble makers, but research the sighting of the army clad so-called Fulanis causing mayhem around the nation and address the issue in an informed manner and appropriately. The man behind the mask may be discovered to be BH. Without a truly national representative body, the Fulanis have become easy masks, to be used by anyone seeking to unsettle the nation. These camouflaged Fulani grazers or BH agents, have recently increased in numbers in the South, and West, for the purpose of a BH build up all around the nation, waiting for the operationalization of the grand plan of national violence, and destabilization, by the political elites, who call the shots. It is a vicious, complex political system, organized to fight for the very soul of the nation, to feed the interests of the political elites, who have threatened the present government with blood flow. Their grand plan is to cause a coordinated nationwide unrest that will loop back in greater insecurity, general government services failure, and to unseat Goodluck Jonathan, and usher in an interim government to oversee the 2015 election; and if this doesn't work out before 2015, then, the worst may yet be in the burners for the nation?

The ultimate demand is to return power to the North, who feel they have the God given right to rule the nation. There are over 450 ethnicities in Nigeria, the Hausa, Yoruba, and Ibo have ruled since 1960. Do the other minorities not have the right to rule? To balance the unwritten zoning mechanisms political parties design and enforce, it is only fair that every ethnic group be given their place to rule Nigeria and no Hausa, Yoruba, or Igbo should make any demand on the exalted office anymore. Where is the fairness? The minorities who are actually greater in number, when put together against the three major groups are not able to organize themselves and exert themselves, because of the divide and rule power play apparatus of the political elites of the three major ethnic groups. These elites clout together, to make Nigeria impossible to understand. The minorities are deceived to hate themselves, so as to keep them apart from one another, made dysfunctional, dislocated, and never allowed to think or even dream the possibility of coming together to take power by mobilizing the supporting votes from their over 447 ethnic groups and communities. I feel sensations that the time is approaching real fast, when the sleeping minority giant will rise up in the North, East, South, West and Middle Belt, come together, and exert itself. If Igbos cry too loud, it may be legitimate, because, the only ever Igbo national leader, ruled Nigeria just a little more than six months before he was brutally gunned down in a coup (Major General Agui Ironsi – head of state, 16<sup>th</sup> January 1966 to 29<sup>th</sup> July 1966). It is the very Hausa Fulani elements in the North, that have always ruled Nigeria, which insists on ruling as a birth right, or blood will flow. They use the North to oppress other tribes, when they insist on the North ruling, that North doesn't include anyone else but they and people of their ethnic extraction. They use the middle as a part of the North when they want to win elections, but the electable northerners don't ever include middle beltters. Nigeria is full of honest, capable minority personalities who can give Nigeria a promising future, but they are never able to rise to the limelight, because of the monetization of the electoral systems, nepotism, feudalism, and godfatherism in the nation. When politicians say, let's put the best brains to stand for our party in general elections, they always come out with someone from the big three; are there no so called best brains amongst the minorities??? Check the Nigerian labor force; you will notice that most of the professionals moving Nigeria forward are from the 447 ethnic groups. Why then is politics so hard for them? Is it really hard for them? Or is the difficulty artificially forced on them? The situation is so bad, that, minorities who join politics, quickly, have to lose their ethnicity, and identify as one of the big three, to find recognition and entrance. It is only on careful scrutiny that one may discover that they are not exactly who they claim to be. Since they are from a minority group, that politically has no voice, no hope, no space and opportunity to rise to the limelight except by piggy backing on one of the big three, they had to camouflage, and play the crowd of the big three to find space.

## **A MANIPULATED SYSTEM**

The BH systems presently are being manipulated intentionally, and strategically, to implement scare tactics with bomb, and physical attack threats, meant to distract, interrupt and paralyze the financial systems (Banks and markets), businesses, induce school closures, transportation and hospitality systems disruptions. The Boko haram systems plan that these threats will rise on an incremental basis, louder and louder, as war drum beats, toward the 2015 election countdown. All these arrangements are well calculated to distract voters and condemn the capacity of the seating government to secure the lives and properties of the people. No one should be deceived, any leader faced with the monumental elite rejection, hatred, and resistance being experienced by the present government will show the same levels of uncertainties, inability and paralysis, especially when the real thing is so veiled with the religious

deception that Boko Haram is shrouded in. Boko Haram conflict is a political struggle by Northern powers to gain back control from what they regard as Christian majority rule. The politics of Nigeria has taken a new turn, this must be accepted and all attempts to change a government must be strategized and targeted at the ballot box, to determine how things must go, and not use violence and campaigns of calumny. This is how democracies grow. They don't grow by killing and maiming the very people the elites intend to rule? If the citizens are all wiped out in violence or bomb blasts, who will be left to be ruled by the political elites? The political elites responsible for the carnage in the nation, are successfully wiping out the engineers, doctors and lawyers etc. who could have served them and taken Nigeria to the next level of development. If elections will be honest, and results counted per head, and not manipulated or twisted, religious factors cannot be divorced from the results that will accrue. From the time high level Muslim political figures began to make statements like, "Muslims across the country should vote only the presidential candidate that would defend and uphold Islam ..." (Nda-Isaiah, 2012); the nation began to drift apart religiously. What used to be a "we" thing, suddenly degenerated into an "us and them." Polarization of any nation cannot be achieved any faster than the use of religious sentiments, especially where there were old existing suspicions and rivalries. Unhealthy comments by respected national figures fuel old enmitous sentiments, and bitter energies like black tornadoes. With presidential candidates warning as early as 2012, that "2015'll be bloody if the elections are not transparent..." (Binniyat, 2012), one then wonders how deep the strategies to destabilize the nation, and realize the bloody prophecy, has gone.

The religious climate of Nigeria had always been different or very mixed, till Muslim leaders and Muslim political elites, who should have known better, began to show open daylight ghettoization of a religious constituency. Anyone with good memory will remember that, Alhaji Moshood Abiola and Baba Gana Kingibe, were both Muslims when they ran as President and vice President, and were presumed landslide winners of the inconclusive June 12, 1993 memorable elections, since no official final results were announced. It has always been that, no one religion, Christian or Muslim, held the two offices at the same time in any political dispensation. That was the first time that formula was tried, and Christians showed strength of character when they gave their votes to two committed Muslims to rule a nation that has a Christian majority (as proved by recent elections). It was not a religious thing as far as Christians were concerned. As long as they were Nigerians, Christians gave them the benefit of the doubt. That formula can't work today anymore, because of the polarization from the sharp comments made and sustained by prominent Muslim political elites. Nothing is impossible in life with God, but restoring Christian confidence in the perception of their togetherness with Muslim in Nigeria on political and election matters, will be a near impossibility, because of the above stated inflammatory utterances, and the effects of the targeted Boko Haram damages to the churches, Christian lives, and businesses all over the nation. It will require monumental systems of advocacy, and propaganda to achieve, and after the feedback loops of pain have been eliminated from the memories of many. All these damage the chances of the many Muslims who desire to live harmoniously with Christians in a 'one Nigeria,' and conduct their lives and businesses without molestation. There are however, still very powerful indications that, Christians and Muslims can live peacefully in the nation when it comes to governance, education, economics, social life, and other areas of interest to all.

A keen understanding of the *systems* of warfare used by Boko Haram alone can help the government strategize effective interruption intervention designs, targeted at the many vulnerable levels of the Boko Haram systems, to strangle, and stifle its networks. These systems are very diverse – people, including the BH militants, are not as diverse, no matter the number of nations they come from. So attention shouldn't be entirely given to understanding the Boko Haram grand leader and the characteristics of the fighters, but the above supporting systems at work in the conflict. People are not that diverse and complex, it is the systems that are diverse, because people basically have the same basic needs, interests and behaviors in given situations that are fairly predictable. The theory of diversity and complexity (Page, 2011) is a detailed explanation of human interaction; humans are not as complex as we attribute to them, but the systems they operate complexify them. The theory of diversity says people are simple, but the systems they operate are the complexity one has to decode to gain access to the mindset of the conflict and its owners. This doesn't demand understanding of the complexity but predictability of patterns and behaviors (Gleick, 1988). So systems, create patterns that if their predictabilities are understood, can create greater productivity in whatever direction one uses them – if one uses them positively or negatively, that is what one gets. Though system patterns are simple, they are highly capable of surprisingly complex behavior and vice versa. Complex systems aim at creating the simplest decisions and tactics for the maximum returns in complex situations (Johnson, 2009). Each elemental component of a conflict system supports considerations, objectives, and choices to look at so as to arrive at an applicable structured, simpler choice, for effective performance and productivity. This is how Boko Haram has been able to surprisingly survive all the numerous offensive control measures against it by government security operatives. Each element of the Boko Haram system studies all the possible response mechanism of the security operatives to an attack scheme, then chooses to use the simplest striking tactic that the security operatives would never imagine they will choose to use. That's how they surprise the operatives, and are always able to carry on new attacks in spite of the tightening up of security in the flash point areas. While the security operatives are fully geared to face them on a high stakes attack, Boko Haram chooses the low stake option, to attack and distract, so next time they then go for the high stakes – so the operatives are taken by surprise again, and shocked. Distraction and attack is the tactic. Their system understands the predictability of patterns. With the generals supplying the militant's vital security information, which is its system's blood, its complex capabilities can be noticed to be, surprisingly run, by some very simple management system maneuvers and procedures. Though systems are so diverse and complex, they

all operate or function in the same manner or way (Page, 2011); which is, they have to be interconnected, resilient, and must be organized to produce something or a predictable outcome. Such patterns of behavior produce feedback, which is a means for change over time. Anyone who understands the dynamism of patterns and systems can manipulate such to his advantage. The systems and complexity theories, though not perfect, just as any other, do tell us a lot about obstinate conflicts like the Boko Haram complex, complicated, and intractable conflict. The universe looks chaotic, but it is a bundle of diversities of systems, working together to achieve constructive ends, nothing repeats itself twice – everything is always changing, never repeating itself, yet perfect in operation and predictability. In like manner, the Boko Haram systems are fluid, always changing in a seeming chaotic manner, like the universe, yet they alone understand the order, predictability, and simplicity involved in the internal workings of the enmeshed systems in producing the desired outcomes of attacks the people witness.

## **HOW TERRORIST GROUPS ORGANIZE THEIR OPERATIONAL SYSTEM**

To appreciate how the Boko haram organism operationalizes itself, John T. Picarelli in an NIJ Journal / Issue No. 264 gives the findings of two experts' debate on the evolving nature of terrorism and its effect on law enforcement:

“According to Hoffman, Most dangerous terrorist groups organize around a center-periphery model. In this model, the leadership and best-trained cells remain in safe havens such as Afghanistan, drawing information, money and practical assistance from support cells working in target countries. When it is time to strike, the attack cells quickly enter, attack, and exit the target country, with the aid of the already-embedded support cells. Organizational control remains centralized with the leadership cells, which give orders to the other groups...Sage-man, on the other hand, sees the most dangerous terrorist organizations centered in small groups that provide their own support. The groups do not travel overseas for specialized training; rather, they educate themselves using sources such as Web postings. Sage-man's groups are more autonomous than the cells that Hoffman describes, in that, they conduct their preparations and attacks from within the community, keeping their own organizational control...NIJ's research on organizational learning and the role of the Internet has found merit in both positions, suggesting a complex reality. A 2005 NIJ study examined terror groups' organization, especially how they get, interpret and disseminate information. The study identified evidence supporting both models of terrorist organization, concluding that how these groups adapt to changing conditions will influence which counterterrorism strategies are most effective...” (Picarelli, undated)

Boko Haram systems conform to both the Sage-man, and Hoffman theories in many ways. They train both outside Nigeria and locally, using web materials and imported military expert trainers. They are aided by their sponsors to find the best guerrilla combat trainers (Fessy, 2014). They also use small splinter groups to provide their own network of support in different community locations nationwide. The leadership and best-trained cells remain in safe havens such as Mambisa forest, Yobe Mountains, and neighboring countries etc. drawing information from their HUMINT, finances and practical provisions from support cells doing business in different cities in Nigeria.

The attack cells strike quickly in a business fashion; they enter attack points, and exit the target location with the aid of the already-embedded community support cells and informants. Their organizational control continues to remain centralized with the leadership hierarchy scattered around the nation, which give orders to the splinter groups. Therefore, killing a Boko Haram kingpin means nothing, because the next man in the leadership hierarchy slips in seamlessly and takes over operations without any noticeable gap. Through the human, political and business network of the political elites, sponsors, and the proxies of the arrested generals, and police collaborators, Boko Haram has safe havens organized in every state. The possible grand plan as rumored around is to mobilize a simultaneous well-coordinated nationwide expression of violence to bring the government to a standstill, and possible collapse, where an interim government would become forcibly necessary. This situation will be preferred by the political opposition so as to have a different leadership in place in Aso villa, who will then serve as a neutral supervisor to the 2015 elections instead of President Goodluck Jonathan. The problem with that is, when there is massive government failure, many unpredictable things become possible. First, the army could step in with a coup. Though the army seems carried along now, any major violence would allow the retired generals at the side lines, who are coup mongers, to step in, and motivate the boys to seize power under the guise of protecting the oneness of the nation. Second, which interim leader is able to organize elections in a failed or terribly insecure state? He must regain control of the different sections of the nation and restore infrastructure and services first, which may take years. Third, Nigerians must remember that there are different regional groups who have been agitation for self-determination, sovereignty, and self-rule. Could they use a national violence to balkanize the nation? Could the Yugoslavian saga happen in such a tightly knitted nation like Nigeria during such moment of weakness? What could the consequences of such a phenomenon be? Could this then end the political ambitions of the greedy elites who want to rule Nigeria by all means, or in the words of General Buhari as stated earlier, “the dog and the baboon will all be covered in blood.” Fourth, even if an interim government is put in place, one can never guarantee that a dictator will not emerge in the appointed interim leader. No one could ever give you any such assurances. Fifth, the other possibility is that PDP may still end up winning the election even with a neutral person in place, because the political landscape of the nation has changed, and PDP for now, seems to have an overwhelming participation of all ethnicities and religious blocks in the nation as opposed to APC which is considered mostly Islamic and dominated by people from two non-mix regional blocks. The threat by APC to have a Muslim-Muslim ticket in the 2015 election, and the domination of Muslims in the party's executive offices is proof of the Muslim domination of APC. In the Nigeria of today, with her

unwritten political power sharing formula of Christian-Muslim President/Vice President or vice-a-vice arrangement, no Muslim-Muslim or Christian/Christian ticket in any party can be considered fair, nor taken kindly or seriously. Another possibility the elites promoting the violence all around the nation have not stopped o consider, is that, if hypothetically, the militants actually overcome government capacity to secure the North, and it falls under their control, the same northern political elites will have no voice in ruling that area. The militants will turn on them first, and wipe them out, because they will be a major political threat to the BH hierarchy. Such Northern elites can't run to southern Nigeria, and hope to go there without a constituency, and have any share in the government of what then will be remaining as Nigeria. So, everyone must look beyond present interests and gains and retrace their steps and embrace peace. The situation today where Boko Haram is said to be fighting to establish an Islamic state in Northern Nigeria, makes all Nigerians cringe and that should include the political elites. BH is systematically wiping out all churches in the North East, under this guise of establishing an Islamic state. They believe the Church is what will keep them from establishing the Islamic state in the North. The late Emir of Kano, Alhaji Ado Bayero, was attacked by BH, because he has always spoken up for religious freedom in Kano, and has refused to cooperate with the radical elements, to attack churches and hurt Christian interests. With his death, many fear the church will face the same threat and fate as the churches in the North East.

Most daring terrorist groups typified by Boko haram systems are used, and seek to be used by anyone who can pay the price for the manifest destruction, and assassinations witnessed so far in Nigeria. They depend on sleeper cells (A sleeper cell is a group of secret agents who specialize in assimilating into another local culture in preparation to commit acts of terror) operating within the community, informants living regular lives in the society, string of lies and deception, creating safe havens in bizarre locations, and don't respect boundary limitations. To them, national boundaries are fluid or artificial, so hold no territorial rights or sovereignty. Because they pursue impossible, self-inclined, incompatible and unbalanced goals against the grind of society and government, they necessarily will have problems with authority figures and the establishment. They are impatient in interpersonal communication and in giving other non-Boko Haram groups feedback. That's why it is so difficult to get them to any form of negotiation. They can't show reason for held grievances; nor are their positions agreeable or useful to any local community, nor do they enjoy buy-ins from any religious or professional group. They are struggling for no community's interest, except for the power brokers, and sharks of the nation, who fan disunity and disaffection for political ends.

## THEORIES OF CHANGE AND PRACTICE

If BH lives and operate in neighboring countries in West, North and Central Africa, and are also attached to, and live in local communities, have infected deeply the security agencies, government establishments and high level leadership in the states and federal government, then the system requires more than a militarized structure to eliminate its threat to society. Such complex conflict systems require a Family of Theories of Change and Practice (TOC) to effectively make necessary impact and necessary transformation. Theories of change are interconnected but distinctive concepts expedient to inform conflict transformation intervention designs, and appropriate monitoring, and evaluation. A TOC says "If this happens...then this given change may result in consequence." A TOC is an explicit presentation of the assumptions about how changes are expected to happen within any particular context and in relation to a particular intervention. It is a specific type of methodology for planning, participation, and evaluation that is used to achieve specific desired outcomes. The following table indicates an example of a theory of change for shift in consciousness (USAID, 2010) for inside out peacebuilding:


Inside-Out Peacebuilding				
This theory focuses on the construction of inclusive identity at the level of individuals. When this inner transformation takes place among key actors and/or enough individuals, they can influence societal patterns, identity groups, institutional performance, and other key actors toward constructive conflict engagement.				
Theory	Statement	Description	Target	Illustrative Activities
Shifts in consciousness	If key actors and/or enough individuals undergo constructive shifts in their consciousness, such as developing more universal identities or awareness of identity formation, then their commitment and capacity for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and for resisting mobilization of conflictual identities, will increase and can influence social change in that area.	This theory focuses on how a transformative experience such as a regular reflection, personal epiphany, deep cognitive dissonance, or psychological development can alter an individual's deep consciousness structures--understanding of him/herself and relations to others and dynamics of conflict--resulting in a greater individual capacity and commitment to peacebuilding. Enough individuals experiencing this shift can generate social change toward resolving constructive conflict management.	Key actors; Individuals	Personal transformation/ consciousness-raising workshops or processes; psychological therapy; meditative activities; educational programs; identity-based training; nonviolent direct action and related acts that challenge assumptions or raise consciousness.

All TOCs in conflict intervention framework operate at three basic levels – design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, each level comes with its own TOCs. The design level TOCs suggest what nature of interventions in line with the conflict context that may likely lead to desired changes. At the implementation level, the TOC's suggest useful indicators to monitor program implementation. These TOCs guide practitioners on how to



adjust to shifts in the conflict context during program implementation. Evaluation TOCs focus appraisal on intended changes. Change must be designed to begin simultaneously from the political and government structures and systems, to the terrorists on a widening circle, and on an incremental basis. Specific TOC design for the Boko Haram conflict systems is beyond the planed scope of this paper. Addressing the Boko haram conflict is like playing a football game. One never can plan ahead how to counter the moves of the enemy; one can only face them on the field as the match unfolds. So the players have to be armed with all kinds of theories of change that can be pulled out of the bag to mesmerize the opponent as the moves are being made in the match. So the technical team's ability to develop theories of change and the team's ability to interpret and translate the theories effectively on the field of play, will determine the potency and superiority of the team.

### Theory of Change Systems: Program Stages



### MONITORING & SUPERVISION WITH TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

FIGURE 3

### PLACES TO INTERVENE IN A SYSTEM FOR INCREMENTAL EFFICIENCY

### Boko Haram Systems intervention Points




FIGURE 4

#### FIGURE 4 LEGEND

##### Places Possible for Strategic Intervention

Government must design a systems framework that can contemporaneously, simultaneously, and synchronously disable these identified pressure points. If this is done, Boko Haram will not be able to recover on time for regrouping and reviving. It needs a high context recovery time; low context recovery time will not do it.

**IPP1 - Interrupt point, priority 1:** Businesses, bank accounts of suspected elites, military officers, governors, business moguls etc. This will dry up the means for arms manufacture and supplies. If, as it is said, that Boko haram is the seventh richest terrorist organization in the world, with a net amount of 70 million dollars (Tribune, 2014), then, someone knows how, where, and when, they make their money and where the 70 million dollars is located. This means, government can, working with regional and international systems, freeze those monies, and plug their means of building up funds. Banks should be fortified to eradicate bank robberies from happening at all; and bad bank officials who collude with BH must be zealously sought out and expelled.

**IPP2 - Interrupt point, priority 2:** Interests – of elites, all Boko Haram participants can be destabilized or shut down.



**IPP3 - Interrupt point, priority 3:** Energy available to fight, Media oxygen – BH use of the social Media, electronic media, print media etc. can also be shut down or severely curtailed.

**IPP4 - Interrupt point, priority 4:** Tap heads **T** can be used to discharge or control any individual flow; they can be turned on and off at any point.

**IPP5 - Interrupt point, priority 5:** Point of losses, as during attacks, or security agent's invasion of militant's camps can be used on a successive strategy to deplete BH strength and fighting zeal.

**IPP6 - Interrupt point, priority 6:** Potential fighters, recruiters must be sought out vigorously both locally and outside the country leasing with regional governments where known recruitments have happened. Media campaign must be spuriously made to educate the public both locally and in potential recruitment nations informing the public that Nigeria is not in Jihad. Consequences of joining BH must be projected, and preached, on the media, and religious worship places.

Interrupting and breaking the seamless flow of the Boko Haram systems will require adequate knowledge, informed by good intelligence. Government systems must work as a unit if they will interrupt and destroy the winding and convoluted nature of the Boko Haram systems. No one can be playing the 'we are better than you game' among the intelligence and security operatives. Intel must be shared securely between agencies. State and local law enforcement agencies must bring the predictability of the Boko Haram patterns into sharper focus. Collected information about specific patterns of Boko Haram events by one agency must be shared with other agencies. This will lead to a better understanding about how the various splinter groups organize and network within communities and how best to counter them systemically and in a coordinated manner. Agencies should also pay closer attention to the use of the internet to promote extremism, which is another important way to understand the trends of the organization. Continued information gathering and vigilance from counterterrorism agencies will inform the system intervention entry points, and will influence how the nation's security strategists develop counterterrorism measures. "If terrorists responsible for collecting and analyzing information are in the community, law enforcement agencies would have to adopt a more active surveillance and investigation plan, than if the terrorists were abroad. Agencies would also have to help identify safe havens that terrorist groups use, such as warehouses, farms or even houses in suburban areas..." (Picarelli, undated).

The following analytical processes are vital for exploring the conflict context for a systems approach to interrupting the terrorists systems and breaking them down.

1. **Archetype Analysis:** These include unconventional and complimentary transformative actions and treatments that fit the observed context, patterns and predictabilities of the conflict. These determinations will support the creation of appropriate TOCs. To arrive at suitable archetype action, ask:

- a. *Who am I?* Who you are may be contributing to the conflict fireworks, so be willing to take unconventional action on those parts of you that are creating the fireworks (in the case of the BH conflict, who am I, will be, who Goodluck Jonathan is to the conflict). Mutual accountability heals conflict faster than the action of the greatest army on earth or playing the blame game. As a nation, what are we? What are we doing now that encourages violence? We must expose our mental models to the light of scrutiny. What one is not willing to scrutinize or put in the light of day may have reasons to be doubted or feared. At the nation's dimension, one may ask, who are the nation's leaders, political elites and other leaders of influence? What are they made of, and how do they add value, or deduct value from the life of nation as it pertains to security? What are they doing that may be contributing to the conflict fireworks?
- b. *Who have I been?* (Could it be the nation's collective past that is creating the fireworks, and the escalation of any aspect of the conflict?) As a nation, what has the system of governance been? What have the systems and structures of the nation done to provoke and support the violence? What kinds of leaders have the nation's captains being, in the past? How has their collective past created the fireworks and escalation in the conflict?
- c. *What connects me with this conflict?* What connects the interests of this nation to the conflict? What connects the leaders (both those in government and in the opposition) with this conflict?
- d. *Why am I drawn to this situation?* What draws the nation to this conflict that it can shed to end the violence or give-up so as to break the interests of the Boko Haram sponsors in continuing the struggle? How are they drawn to the conflict? What legitimate interests, ambitions and calculations, have the national leaders stepped on, to offend the Boko Haram sponsor's sensibilities?
- e. *What are the leverage points available to us?* What issue in the arena of conflict can be used as a quality or advantage to obtain the desired effect or result? What does the nation need to give up or put in, that will tilt the balance of advantage to the nation. When nations use the carrot, and the stick model to settle conflicts, they are only seeking leverage. So what leverage can the nation use in this situation?

2. **Structural and Systemic Shifts:** These are the mind-sets that one must strive to drive or shift out of the conflict parties, the public and the government. Reconstruction of political institutions can resolve complex political gridlock crisis (North, 1990, p. 89). North (1990) says "the key to 'conflict transformation is' continuous incremental changes in institutional contexts that make possible new bargains and compromises between the players...Political institutions, whether formal or informal can provide hospitable framework for evolutionary change." North (1990) also says the inability to achieve joint solutions may reflect the lack of mediating institutions, and limited degrees of freedom of the parties to bargain and still remain loyal to their constituencies. If these degrees of freedom are created, they will provide the necessary fertile ground for a resolution. Necessary political shifts will include working on the systems of governance, resource sharing, and election reforms, decoding the radicalization processes, disarmament, de-radicalization programs, and SSR – Security Sector Reform. An effective systems response mechanism that will

adequately heal the BH systems must include the following components which must be radically transformed: the electoral, technological, economic, agricultural and educational opportunity components that not only provide jobs to the youths, but affordable food, status changing economic activities, and change of national consciousness by adequate public education. The dysfunctional security sector that is unable to provide security to the state and its people effectively under democratic principles needs serious reforms – including restructuring and increasing numerical and re-equipping of the military, intelligence and the police systems. SSR can be used to create a pattern shift that can transform the conflict dynamics. Abolish all structural and systemic sources of widespread insecurity, oppression, injustice and impunity due to discriminatory and abusive policies or practices. An unreformed or misconstrued security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable development, democracy and peace. SSR processes therefore seek to enhance the delivery of effective and efficient security and justice services, by security sector institutions that are accountable to the state and its people, and operate within a framework of democratic governance, without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law, (United Nations, 2014). SSR efforts target all state institutions and other entities with a role in ensuring the security of the state, and its people, including: armed forces; law enforcement and intelligence services; institutions responsible for border management and customs services; justice and penal institutions; and actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, parliaments, ombudspersons, human rights commissions, and civil society organizations. In some contexts, it also addresses non-state armed groups and/or private security and military companies. SSR is both an operational as well as a normative concept. Featuring norms such as good governance, civilian oversight and the rule of law among its defining characteristics, its inclusion as a necessary component of international policies addressing post-conflict situations is becoming more and more commonplace (United Nations, 2014). As such, SSR can be seen as a branch of an increasing international effort to secure human security (DCAF, 2014). In tandem with the revelations of military generals and other army officers being directly involved with Boko Haram, purging the Army, Police and Immigration service will be high stake assignment for the government. Anyone on the suspicious border must be cleaned out, and settled according to the graveness of the suspicion.

3. **Outcome:** What is the intended outcome from the structural and systemic shifts? What sacrifices need to be made and what shortages need to be satisfied.

4. **Dynamism:** The system must be self-adding, evolving and transforming.

5. **Justice:** Call people to take responsibility for their actions and utterances using incentives, punishments, and constraints.

6. **System Limitation:** Who will have access to what and which information, when and how?

**Structures:** appropriate system impacting structures must be established that can fully discern roots, sources, core issue, stem and branches and fruits of the conflict. This could be efficient conflict and security analysis configurations or teams. Use language carefully and enhance it with system images that can clearly communicate intentions.

7. **Reinforcing Feedback loops:** Classify your leverage driving loops, and identify how to strengthen them. Make feedback policies for feedback systems (Meadows, 2008, p. 194). Work with the system as it evolves. Locate the varied responsibilities within the system as it evolves, and give room for complexity. Feedback loops are catalysts for change over time.

8. **Balancing Feedback Loops:** Identify what your feedbacks loops (Meadows, 2008, p. 194) need, to correct and power them. That is what the progressive change the feedback loops are requesting. Seek to impact the forest (systems) not just the trees (individual events).

9. **Feedback delays:** Identify the time period relative to both conflict and intervention system changes to enable ameliorative supportive action.

10. **Buffers:** The sizes of stabilizing stocks relative to their flow. Stabilizing stock in the BH conflict are the security operatives and the policies made by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government to support the fight against terror.

11. **Powering Structures:** Appropriate system impacting structures must be established that can fully discern roots, sources, core issue, stem and branches and fruits of the conflict. This could be efficient conflict and security analysis configurations or teams. Pay attention to elements that are important, not just numerically advantageous.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

I encourage government to take the steps and actions that will work, and not just be reacting to the daily BH conflict events and outbursts. Leaders are ultimately judged by what they do in emerging crises, not by what they say, but by taking objective action that work, action that will ultimately count for positive transformational change. If government reads the complex systems of Boko Haram well, they will arrest not just the army officers involved in betraying the nation to Boko haram, but the political elites who made treasonable comments about making Nigeria ungovernable, and the other multi-level elemental personalities and schemes involved in the Boko Haram conflict systems. If this is done, the rest of the complex systems that depend on the elites will be mortally impacted and dismantled in due season. If this is not done however, government will only be dealing with the symptoms of the situation and may never snuff oxygen, and the blood off the BH conflict system, and the militants with their networks. My suggestion for arrests is predicated on the fact that, when these elites speak, their pronouncements are always followed up by BH action to actualize the threats, indicating a strong connection. One only needs to look at the string of events down the Nigerian insecurity road, from 2010 to the present, and one will be convinced of the

connections between what the political elites have said, and the insecurity that has been prevalent. Nothing has been random, but very strategic, and tactical. The Bible says “Your words will be used to judge you---to declare you either innocent or guilty,” Mat 12:37. Someone might say I sympathize with the President. I guess it is not easy balancing the various interests that interplay at that level, so he can’t just wake up and arrest these elites. Not doing this arrest is like delaying the day of death. Yes, we want peace, but peace to a sick body sometimes, means quarantining the bacteria causing the ailment. We know that an elephant can’t be taken without hurting some trees, if that’s how they want it, or how it must be, then so be it, that the future generation may have sanity. As long as the monopoly of legal or legitimate coercion is with government, it must exercise its people given right to secure the society, by every means necessary. Nigeria must be greater than anyone or any one’s political interests and interplays. Without the people, there would be no elites, so why trample the grass and genealogy that makes you who you are? As has been said already, leaders will ultimately be judged by what they do in emerging crises, not by the fair speeches, and the compassionate promises they make, but by taking objective action that work, action that will ultimately count for positive transformational change. I encourage government to take the type of action that will work, the longer the president feels it is too hot at the elites level to contemplate the arrest of these people, he may wake up one day and discover he has no country to rule, firstly because the political elites have outsmarted him, since they are bent on using their interconnectedness to undercut him, and will use anything, even a coup to remove him, (and I hope he knows they have the military in their grip! It’s no problem, they have commanded the troops before, and so, it’s absolutely normal that they can speak into the army. But the president has the overarching, present tense power!) Secondly, without action that works, a successive well-coordinated nationwide violence could happen that will really render the government weak and incapable of controlling the regions; thereby forcing the army to legitimately take over under the pretext of defending national security. Government must stop being mediocre in thought and begin to think like elders and leaders. The president must stop thinking too much, and start acting appropriately. He cannot afford to be a ball juggler, so must stop balancing interests and interplays and face the threats to security squarely. If these elites were in power, and he uttered equally treasonable threats, I promise you, he would have been locked up or dead long ago. Nigerians are glad their president is not quick to be vengeful; however, while he is balancing designs and interests, the elites continue acting on him and the masses in BH attacks. Government needs to balance the deaths on the streets in bombs and the blazing guns of BH, rather than the fear of elites and glass house balancing of interests between him and the political elites. Well, Nigerians will ultimately be forced to rise up for themselves if the politicians won’t protect them, who instead, keep balancing political power, interests and interplays. Politicians behave like blind dogs in a smoke house. Is it so hard to see that you don’t have to wait too long till the whole population is decimated before they rule an empty nation? If things continue the way they are, one may be foreseeing an Arab spring type uprising in Nigeria, if leaders won’t be real and do what will work. Nigerians should never be taken for a ride nor for granted, that they will always be docile as they are today. Revolutions like the Arab spring normally happen when the cup of the politicians is really full, and it will be bad for all. Everyone is crying about impunity, but no one wants to do anything about or against it. People are free to be themselves, say what they want, but their freedom stops where the other man’s liberty and space begins. When you threaten another and someone from the bunnies, steps out, and acts out the threat, you could be culpable. If I told you in the heat of an argument that I will kill you if you don’t stop doing what you are doing, and you continue doing the thing anyway, and someone who heard me comes at night to kill you, I could be fully responsible, because I was heard openly threatening that I will kill. The courts will definitely find me guilty. The words of the political elites can be regarded as probable cause and circumstantial evidence for all the BH violence, since correlations can be established between their treasonable comments and the various Boko Haram violence. This is like evidence that relies on an inference to connect it to a conclusion of fact—like a fingerprint at the scene of a crime, there are numerous additional evidence or inference that can be built into their words that can accumulate into a collection, so that all the pieces then become corroborating evidence. Testimonies from arrested BH agents can be used with the corroborating evidence to gain direct evidence. If witnesses have claims they saw, heard, handled the finance, communication with, and any form of contact with any of the elites, such can be considered direct evidence. “Many successful criminal prosecutions rely largely or entirely on circumstantial evidence, and civil charges are frequently based on circumstantial or indirect evidence. “Much of the evidence against convicted American bomber Timothy McVeigh was circumstantial, for example. Speaking about McVeigh’s trial, University of Michigan law professor Robert Precht said, “Circumstantial evidence can be, and often is much more powerful than direct evidence” (Precht, 2013). “In practice, circumstantial evidence can have an advantage over direct evidence, in that it can come from multiple sources that check, and reinforce each other” (Massachusetts Courts, 2014).

Criminal Code Act Chapter 77, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, section 37(1) says, “any person who levies war against the State, in order to intimidate or overawe the President or the Governor of a State, is guilty of treason, ...” The war *presently* raging with Boko Haram, was entered into by reason of the *treasonable* comments made by some political elites. They need to be called to take responsibility and account for their instigation. These elites may not be considered patriots, they love themselves, power, and money, more than they love Nigeria and the generations yet unborn. If they were patriots, they would confess and forsake their secret evil schemings, and bloodful deeds, rather than tear up the nation. No true mother says, if I can’t have the baby, kill it, so we all lose. A war is any organized and often prolonged armed conflict that is carried out by states or non-state actors. It is generally characterized by life-threatening violence, social disturbance and economic devastation. War is understood as any real, premeditated, and widespread armed conflict between political interests, ideologies and communities, therefore

it is also defined as a form of political violence or intrusion. Nigeria is officially at war, and the Boko Haram conflict must be addressed as such to finally resolve the situation. If the political elite shylocks are not arrested and prosecuted, they will be the reason why Nigeria may be a failed state by 2015 or shortly thereafter; unless the conflict is settled some other way.

When Asari Dokubo in reaction to the treasonable comments made by some political elites, “insisted that the people of the Niger Delta would make the country ungovernable if President Jonathan was not re-elected,” (Adebayo, 2014). He was quickly arrested, and rightly so, by the Department of State Security (DSS), because of pressures from northern political elites, against whom his statement was directed. One then wonders why the political elites, who made worse statements, without fully telling us how they will make the country ungovernable, are still walking the high streets, free. Dokubo told us clearly how he will make the nation ungovernable; he did not hide his modus operandi. He said “In less than one hour, the way we would strike, the world will be shocked. “If anybody does anything against Jonathan, we will retaliate. What we will do will shock the whole world. We will cripple the economy of the country not only in the creeks, but also on the nation’s territorial waters, no vessel will be allowed to enter Nigeria’s territorial waters,” (Adebayo, 2014).

If, as indicated by this paper, there is general violence and confusion in the nation as designed by the Boko Haram strategic and tactical systems, with its cells spread around the nation to achieve this, the central government will become so weak or ineffective, that it will have little practical control over much of the regions. Resulting in general inability, and failure of public services, widespread corruption, and criminality; which in turn creates refugees, and involuntary movement of populations, leading to sharp economic decline, and inability to provide any sort of security; of course, the state will fail. It will then be unable to neither interact with other states as a full member of the international community, nor have the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in its boundaries, due to the erosion of the power to make collective decisions. So, government must do what will work for the survival of the nation. No one is expecting an organized firing squad for the sponsors of Boko Haram soon, but some strategic arrests are a fair expectation; and prosecution of those who made spurious treasonable statements, and also those who gave monies to organizations that have either disappeared, or have shown no proof of the legitimate public use of such monies given them. They should be tried, and imprisoned, to allow the nation study them and their strategic schemes and systems for learning against future terrorism.

The use of control measures such as state of emergency, curfews, and check points, and road blocks have so far gone a long way to help; but to effectively meet the Boko haram systems’ challenges with an equally effective system, government will need to set up a modality of control with a complex adjunct legal system, to include military courts to try militants, and anyone who has been implicated in anyway with the Boko haram systems. This allows for immediate dispensation of justice. This should then be followed by a military court of appeal. These cases should not be allowed in civil courts, because anyone that is involved in a military style war with the state must be met with appropriate military styled justice. Since Boko Haram fights with military technology, strategies and tactics, they must be treated as soldiers/enemy combatants, not civilians. They are not civilians, because civilians don’t take up arms consistently against their nation. If suspected soldiers are court martialed in military courts, anyone confronting the nation with war must be tried in the same way. Taking such to civil courts would only allow suspected, corrupt judges, that are secret admirers or sympathetic to BH to release them; but military judges should be soldiers knowledgeable in law, and also have had to sacrifice their lives daily, fighting this conflict, and so would face issues with appropriate gravity and honesty. If this is done, it will become a deterrent to aspiring militants. When the BH militants are convicted in such military Courts, they should not be held up in civil prisons, but military cells, to prevent corrupt police, and prison officials from releasing them prematurely. Other control modalities could include a new check point arrangement, which should be daily, but temporary, random, staggered, irregular, unpredictable and used wisely all over the flash point areas including the bushes and uninhabited areas. No more should checkpoints be permanent fixtures on the landscape of the cities (when they are permanent, militants devise means of predicting and circumventing them), a change in power relations in the flash point areas must be made from civil initiatives to the use of military orders, and administrative arrangements instead of civil legislation to keep the BH system second guessing the security agencies. Military orders could be in the form of decrees issued by the military commanders, which immediately become laws in the local area. Such orders should change as often as the conflict dynamics require, meeting with the new challenges. The use of *temporary ID cards* for people in the flash point areas to be issued by the military, with the capture of the individual’s full biometrics, will help in controlling the influx of aliens and identify militants who may dare to come to obtain the IDs. These IDs may be used as identification reference points during curfews, snap check points, or when inspecting local areas suspected of infiltration by militants, or the presence of sleeper cells, or during random general checks. Israel had to install some control measures when it took Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 1967; she employed a series of strategies to govern the populations to stifle guerilla styled insurgency. If Israel had not done so, it would not have successfully governed the area in the face of violent insurgencies (Gordon, 2008). Regulations and control measures for the use of public places like parks, bus stations, schools, shopping complexes etc. that are unavoidably crowded daily (impromptu stop searches), levels of control of movement must be creatively developed, endless rigorous multi-level and multi-type surveillance of the population must be mounted (most control measures will depend on this), every aspect of the community must be surveyed, examined, scrutinized, and recorded to fish out miscreants. A detailed aerial surveillance of all locales and wildernesses not fully covered by policing must be carried out regularly all around the nation especially in flash point areas, to identify any developments of hideouts before they become too strong and unmanageable. Monitoring of all

forms of communication must be fully engaged – phones, cyberspace, texts, mails, etc. Fulani migration through the farms, bushes and wildernesses must be fully covered by the above suggested haphazard checkpoints.

## CONCLUSION

If the world was in any way willing to listen to any Boko Haram grievances in the past, the kidnap and theft of the Chibok girls; and the betrayal of public trust by the military generals and officers, burnt all the bridges of such benefits. They now want to see Boko Haram brought to justice and accountability to install peace and security. Boko Haram overdid, overreached, and overstretched themselves and their welcome, by these infamous acts. The wild desires of all peace loving people of the world on Boko Haram is left to anyone's guess.

With recent discoveries of the military, police, and immigration connections to BH, and the exposure of the grand plan of the Boko Haram systems to create widespread violence. Boko Haram should no more remain an enigma, it can be strategically undermined, while security, and sanity are restored to the troubled regions, by putting in place systemic control measures that will be timely, effective, and by taking fearless action that will make transforming things work.

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